T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:93- Finding
Unpinned External Repository and Installer Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:93-107;README.md:32-38
Vulnerability Type: Unverified and mutable external installation dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet
From
SKILL.md:93-107:markdown ## Quick install summary 1) Clone the full UNCLEMATTCLAWBOT repo (this skill folder alone is not enough). 2) Install OpenClaw. 3) Run the installer from the repo: - macOS/Linux: `installer/setup.sh` - Windows: `installer/setup.ps1` 4) Edit actions in `broker/config/actions.default.json`, validate, and restart the Broker.From
README.md:32-38:markdown ## Install (fast path) 1) Clone the full UNCLEMATTCLAWBOT repo. 2) Install OpenClaw. 3) From the repo root: - macOS/Linux: `installer/setup.sh` - Windows: `installer/setup.ps1` 4) Edit actions in `broker/config/actions.default.json`. 5) Validate actions: `scripts/validate-actions.sh` 6) Restart broker: `docker compose up -d --build`Technical Analysis
The supplied project is documentation-only and does not contain the Broker, installer scripts, Docker configuration, or dependency manifests needed for the advertised functionality. Instead, operators are instructed to clone
https://github.com/uncmatteth/UNCLEMATTCLAWBOTand execute platform-specific installer scripts from that external repository.The instructions do not pin the external source to an immutable commit or signed release and do not require verification through a cryptographic checksum or signature. Consequently, the code ultimately executed may differ from the content that existed when this skill artifact was reviewed. The subsequent Docker build may also process additional dependencies that cannot be assessed from the supplied package.
No malicious behavior was demonstrated in the audited files. The vulnerability is the unverified supply-chain trust boundary and the inability to establish that the external inst ...[truncated 1510 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin installation instructions to an exact commit hash or immutable release tag rather than a mutable default branch.
- Publish signed release artifacts and cryptographic checksums for installer scripts, Broker binaries, Docker files, and configuration templates.
- Require signature or checksum verification before any installer is executed.
- Vendor the reviewed installer and Broker implementation into the distributed package, or provide a reproducible build whose source and resulting artifacts can be independently verified.
- Document the minimum permissions required by each installation step and explicitly discourage running installers as an administrator or root user unless strictly necessary.
- Pin container base images by digest and lock all package dependencies to reviewed versions.
- Add automated release controls, including dependency scanning, provenance attestations, protected branches, mandatory review, and CI-generated software bills of materials.
- Advise operators to inspect installer changes and test installation in an isolated environment before production deployment.