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Security audit

Genviral

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent Genviral social-media automation wrapper, but it also recommends unattended self-updates that replace its own instructions and scripts from an unsigned remote branch.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Use it only with a Genviral key and connected accounts you are comfortable automating, disable or avoid the daily self-updater unless you manually review diffs first, avoid unattended posting until you add an explicit approval step, and keep API keys in a tightly controlled environment rather than a shared global env file.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/update-skill.sh:71
Finding

Automatic Self-Update Replaces Trusted Instructions and Executable Scripts with Unverified Remote Content

Content
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/dev/null || echo "")}" REMOTE_SHA=$(curl -sf \ -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.v3+json" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $GH_TOKEN" \ "https://api.github.com/repos/fdarkaou/genviral-skill/commits/$REMOTE_BRANCH" \ | jq -r '.sha' 2>/dev/null || echo "") if [[ -z "$REMOTE_SHA" ]]; then echo "ERROR: Could not fetch remote SHA. Check network or GITHUB_TOKEN." exit 1 fi echo "Remote SHA: $REMOTE_SHA" if [[ "$CURRENT_SHA" == "$REMOTE_SHA" && "$FORCE" != "true" ]]; then echo "Already up to date. Nothing to do." exit 0 fi echo "Update available! Applying..." UPDATED_FILES=() FAILED_FILES=() for FILE in "${SKILL_OWNED_FILES[@]}"; do RAW_URL="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fdarkaou/genviral-skill/$REMOTE_SHA/$FILE" TARGET="$SKILL_DIR/$FILE" if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == "true" ]]; then echo "[DRY RUN] Would update: $FILE" continue fi # Fetch and write atomically TMPFILE=$(mktemp) if curl -sf "$RAW_URL" -o "$TMPFILE"; then mkdir -p "$(dirname "$TARGET")" mv "$TMPFILE" "$TARGET" # Make scripts executable [[ "$FILE" == scripts/* ]] && chmod +x "$TARGET" UPDATED_FILES+=("$FILE") echo " ✓ Updated: $FILE" else rm -f "$TMPFILE" # File may not exist in remote (optional file) — not a hard error FAILED_FILES+=("$FILE") echo " - Skipped (not found in remote): $FILE" fi done ``` The setup documentation recommends executing this updater every day: ```bash openclaw cron add \ --name "Genviral: Daily Skill Update" \ --cron "0 6 * * *" ...[truncated 3106 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/genviral.sh:192
Finding

Global Environment File Is Executed as Arbitrary Shell Code

Content
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/dev/null || true API_KEY="${GENVIRAL_API_KEY:-}" BASE_URL="$(config_get base_url "https://www.genviral.io/api/partner/v1")" DEFAULT_PACK_ID="$(config_get default_pack_id "")" DEFAULT_SLIDE_COUNT="$(config_get default_slide_count "5")" DEFAULT_ASPECT_RATIO="$(config_get default_aspect_ratio "4:5")" DEFAULT_TYPE="$(config_get default_type "educational")" DEFAULT_STYLE="$(config_get default_style_preset "tiktok")" DEFAULT_LANGUAGE="$(config_get language "en")" DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_IDS="$(config_get default_account_ids "")" DEFAULT_PRIVACY="$(config_get privacy_level "PUBLIC_TO_EVERYONE")" DEFAULT_POST_MODE="$(config_get post_mode "DIRECT_POST")" HTTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT="$(config_get connect_timeout "10")" HTTP_MAX_TIME="$(config_get max_time "120")" HTTP_RETRIES="$(config_get retries "2")" HTTP_RETRY_DELAY="$(config_get retry_delay "2")" } ``` ### Technical Analysis The Bash `source` builtin does not parse an environment file as passive key-value data. It evaluates the complete file as shell syntax in the current process. Command substitutions, function declarations, redirections, process launches, and arbitrary commands contained in the file are executed immediately. The file is named `global.env`, indicating that it may be shared with unrelated tools. Consequently, compromise or unsafe modification by another local component becomes a code-execution path whenever any `genviral.sh` command is invoked. Redirecting stderr to `/dev/null` can also conceal errors or indicators generated by malicious statements. The Skill only needs `GENVIRAL_API_KEY`; executing a ...[truncated 1338 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/genviral.sh:192
Finding

Configurable API Base URL Can Redirect the Genviral Bearer Credential

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null || true API_KEY="${GENVIRAL_API_KEY:-}" BASE_URL="$(config_get base_url "https://www.genviral.io/api/partner/v1")" DEFAULT_PACK_ID="$(config_get default_pack_id "")" DEFAULT_SLIDE_COUNT="$(config_get default_slide_count "5")" DEFAULT_ASPECT_RATIO="$(config_get default_aspect_ratio "4:5")" DEFAULT_TYPE="$(config_get default_type "educational")" DEFAULT_STYLE="$(config_get default_style_preset "tiktok")" DEFAULT_LANGUAGE="$(config_get language "en")" DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_IDS="$(config_get default_account_ids "")" DEFAULT_PRIVACY="$(config_get privacy_level "PUBLIC_TO_EVERYONE")" DEFAULT_POST_MODE="$(config_get post_mode "DIRECT_POST")" HTTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT="$(config_get connect_timeout "10")" HTTP_MAX_TIME="$(config_get max_time "120")" HTTP_RETRIES="$(config_get retries "2")" HTTP_RETRY_DELAY="$(config_get retry_delay "2")" } ``` ```bash api_call() { local method="$1" local endpoint="$2" local body="${3:-}" local url="${BASE_URL%/}${endpoint}" local curl_args=( -sS --connect-timeout "$HTTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT" --max-time "$HTTP_MAX_TIME" --retry "$HTTP_RETRIES" --retry-delay "$HTTP_RETRY_DELAY" -X "$method" -H "Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -w '\n%{http_code}' ) [[ -n "$body" ]] && curl_args+=(-d "$body") local response response="$(curl "${curl_args[@]}" "$url" 2>&1)" || { die "Request failed: curl error for $method $endpoint" } ``` The configuration path is sele ...[truncated 2360 chars]
Remediation
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other

Warning
Location
scripts/genviral.sh:3454
Finding

Full Pipeline Posts Content Without Enforcing the Declared Visual Review Gate

Content
View full analysis
&2 step "Step 3/4: Review rendered slideshow" local review_result review_result="$(cmd_review --id "$slideshow_id" --json)" || die "Pipeline failed at review step." # ----- Step 4: Post ----- local post_id="" if [[ "$skip_post" == true ]]; then echo "" >&2 step "Step 4/4: Skipped (--skip-post)" else echo "" >&2 step "Step 4/4: Post as draft" local post_result post_result="$(cmd_post_draft --id "$slideshow_id" --caption "$caption" --account-ids "$account_ids")" || die "Pipeline failed at post step." post_id="$(printf '%s' "$post_result" | jq -r '.id // ._id // .post.id // empty')" fi ``` The declared safety requirement in `SKILL.md:141-144` states: ```markdown 2. **ALWAYS visually review every rendered slide** before posting. If any slide fails readability, fix it. This is a hard gate — not a suggestion. ``` ### Technical Analysis The pipeline labels a slideshow-detail retrieval operation as “Review.” `cmd_review --json` obtains and returns slideshow data, but the pipeline does not: - Open or analyze each rendered image. - Ask the user to inspect the slides. - Obtain an explicit approval decision. - Validate a signed or stateful approval record. - Evaluate readability or safety criteria. - Stop posting when review criteria fail. The only enforced condition is whether the API retrieval succeeds. After successful retrieval, the pipeline proceeds directly to `cmd_post_draft`. Although the current function posts through the draft-oriented command rather than necessarily publishing publicly, this still creates or transfers content to a connected social-media workflow. The behavior does not satisf ...[truncated 1395 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (44)

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Documenting and encouraging a self-updater for an agent skill is a real self-modification risk because it permits code and instruction changes after initial installation. Given this skill can post to social accounts and influence agent behavior through updated scripts and SKILL/docs content, a compromised updater or source repo could lead to unauthorized actions, credential misuse, or persistent malicious behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 120)May include surrounding context.

md
scripts/
    genviral.sh             # 42+ commands wrapping every Partner API endpoint
    update-skill.sh         # Self-updater (keeps skill files current, never touches workspace/)

  prompts/
    slideshow.md            # Prompt templates for slideshow generation

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose focuses on social media automation, but the skill also includes self-updating behavior, remote GitHub fetches, local file modification, and other operational capabilities not surfaced in the primary description. This mismatch is dangerous because users and orchestration systems may trust the skill for one purpose while it performs supply-chain-relevant actions that can alter its own code or environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The presence of a self-updater means the skill can modify its own scripts and documentation after installation. Self-modification is dangerous because it enables supply-chain compromise, persistence, and post-review behavior changes, especially when updates are pulled from a remote repository rather than a pinned, verified artifact.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 98)May include surrounding context.

scripts/ genviral.sh # Main API wrapper (all commands) update-skill.sh # Self-updater

text

## Command Routing

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The auto-update section explicitly instructs execution of a script that checks for and applies remote updates to skill-owned files. In this context, that creates a direct path for remote code and behavior changes outside the original review boundary, making the skill materially more dangerous than a static API wrapper.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 160)May include surrounding context.

Auto-Updates

This skill includes a self-updater that keeps skill-owned files in sync with the latest version from fdarkaou/genviral-skill.

bash
bash scripts/update-skill.sh           # check + apply if updates available

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 168)May include surrounding context.

md
**What gets updated (skill-owned):** `SKILL.md`, `scripts/`, `docs/` (all subdirs)

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · docs/api/pipeline.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

Assign best-matching image to each slide. Build a pinned_images map.

5. Prompt Assembly

Use the selected hook and visual direction to build a slideshow prompt. Reference workspace/content/scratchpad.md and docs/prompts/slideshow.md.

6. Generate WITH Pinned Images

bash

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · docs/prompts/slideshow.md (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

md
# Slideshow Prompt Templates

Use these templates when generating slideshows via the genviral API. Before using any template:

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The daily self-updater instructs the agent to run a script that pulls and applies upstream changes to SKILL.md, scripts/, and docs/ automatically. This is dangerous because it enables remote self-modification of the skill's behavior and trusted instructions without human review, potentially introducing malicious logic, altered prompts, or unsafe commands into future runs.

Content

Scanner excerpt · docs/setup.md (reported line 204)May include surrounding context.

--cron "0 6 * * *"
--tz "YOUR_TIMEZONE"
--session isolated
--message "Run the genviral skill self-updater: bash scripts/update-skill.sh. It will check for updates to SKILL.md, scripts/, and docs/ from the upstream repo and apply them. Never touches workspace/. Report what was updated or confirm already up to date."
--announce

text

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/genviral.sh (reported line 612)May include surrounding context.

sh
analytics-target-create         POST /analytics/targets
  analytics-target                GET /analytics/targets/{id}
  analytics-target-update         PATCH /analytics/targets/{id}
  analytics-target-delete         DELETE /analytics/targets/{id}
  analytics-target-refresh        POST /analytics/targets/{id}/refresh
  analytics-refresh | get-analytics-refresh
                                  GET /analytics/refreshes/{id}

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/genviral.sh (reported line 1513)May include surrounding context.

sh
require_arg "id" "$pack_id"
    warn "Deleting pack $pack_id..."

    api_call DELETE "/packs/${pack_id}" >/dev/null

    ok "Pack deleted."
}

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/genviral.sh (reported line 1572)May include surrounding context.

sh
warn "Deleting image $image_id from pack $pack_id..."

    api_call DELETE "/packs/${pack_id}/images/${image_id}" >/dev/null

    ok "Image deleted from pack."
}

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/genviral.sh (reported line 1795)May include surrounding context.

sh
require_arg "id" "$template_id"
    warn "Deleting template $template_id..."

    api_call DELETE "/templates/${template_id}" >/dev/null

    ok "Template deleted."
}

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/genviral.sh (reported line 2244)May include surrounding context.

sh
require_arg "id" "$slideshow_id"
    warn "Deleting slideshow $slideshow_id..."

    api_call DELETE "/slideshows/${slideshow_id}" >/dev/null

    ok "Slideshow deleted."
}

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/genviral.sh (reported line 2862)May include surrounding context.

sh
warn "Deleting analytics target $id..."

    local response
    response="$(api_call DELETE "/analytics/targets/${id}")"

    ok "Analytics target deleted"
    printf '%s' "$response" | jq '.data'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The README promotes automated posting, analytics collection, and strategy adjustment without clearly warning that prompts, media, account identifiers, and performance data will be transmitted to third-party services. In a skill designed for cross-platform publishing and analytics, unclear disclosure raises privacy and consent risks, especially if agents act on behalf of users or organizations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README claims a mandatory visual review 'hard gate' before posting, but the Quick Start later shows a direct render and create-post flow with no enforced review step. This mismatch can cause operators or downstream agents to assume safety checks exist when they do not, increasing the chance of unintended or harmful content being published automatically.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The Quick Start includes live posting commands against connected accounts without a conspicuous caution that they can immediately publish content publicly. In an automation skill, runnable examples are likely to be copied verbatim by users or agents, so omission of a warning materially increases the risk of accidental publication and reputational harm.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The README advertises a self-updating mechanism that can overwrite skill-owned files such as SKILL.md, scripts, and docs. In an agent-skill context, this expands the trust boundary from the local checked-in code to whatever remote source the updater fetches, creating a supply-chain and self-modification risk if the repository or update channel is compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises shell-backed automation but does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates an overbroad execution surface where an agent may invoke shell commands beyond what a user would reasonably infer from the metadata, increasing the chance of unintended command execution or abuse through prompt-driven routing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The configuration sets language: "en" as a fixed default, which can impose a specific language/locale behavior without indicating user choice or region-specific justification. This is a natural-language policy concern because it may cause the skill to operate in English regardless of the user's preferred language.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The documentation exposes a destructive command that deletes analytics targets without any warning about permanence, scope, or the need for explicit user confirmation before execution. In an automation-oriented skill, this increases the chance that an agent or user invokes deletion accidentally or as part of a broader workflow, causing loss of tracked account configuration and disrupting analytics operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation exposes a destructive delete-pack command with no warning that it permanently removes user-managed content, and no guidance to verify the target ID before execution. In an automation-oriented skill, operators may copy/paste commands or let agents invoke them, increasing the chance of accidental deletion of packs and downstream content loss.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The delete-pack-image command is documented as a simple removal action without cautioning that it deletes pack contents and may disrupt slideshow generation or existing workflows that depend on those images. Because this skill is designed for full content-pipeline automation, omission of deletion safety guidance makes accidental or scripted data loss more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The workflow explicitly publishes content to external social media accounts and logs persistent identifiers such as account_id, post_id, platform, and engagement metrics, but the documentation provides no user-facing consent, confirmation, or safety warning before these actions. In an agent skill, this is dangerous because a user or higher-level orchestrator could trigger real posting and tracking behavior with reputational, privacy, and operational consequences that are not clearly surfaced at the decision point.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The documentation exposes bulk post-deletion commands without any warning about destructive impact, confirmation prompts, or safer usage guidance. In an automation skill for cross-platform publishing, this increases the likelihood of accidental or scripted mass deletion of scheduled, draft, or active content, especially when users copy-paste examples directly into production workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.