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Security audit

Mobility Quote

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward mobility quote integration, but it sends trip coordinates to a third-party service and relays provider links back to the user.

Install only if you are comfortable sending trip origins and destinations to the configured KLO Mobility endpoint. Treat returned prices, summaries, provider names, and deeplinks as third-party supplied; check the destination before opening any ride link.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:34
Finding

Unvalidated Third-Party Response Content and Deeplink Forwarding

Content
View full analysis
to `. The public instance currently supports `lat,lon` coordinates. Place-name geocoding is added when a mapping API key is configured. ## Reading the response The result is an A2A message. `parts[0].text` is a human summary; `parts[1].data` holds structured fields: - `best` — cheapest estimate or quote (`provider`, `product`, `price`, `currency`, `eta`) or `null` when no price is available. - `all_quotes[]` — every quote returned, sorted by price. - `route_launchers[]` — deeplinks like `{ "label": "Open in Yandex Go", "provider": "Yandex Go", "url": "..." }` to hand to the user. Present the cheapest option (or the launcher when there is no price), the ETA, and the deeplink. If `best.details.estimate` is true, label it as an estimate, not a live provider fare. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill sends precise origin and destination coordinates to an externally operated service. The destination can be changed through the `MOBILITY_AGENT_URL` environment variable and otherwise defaults to an IP-derived `sslip.io` hostname. The instructions direct the agent to consume `parts[0].text` and forward URLs from `route_launchers[]` without requiring: - Response-schema or data-type validation. - HTTPS-only URL enforcement. - An allowlist of ...[truncated 2382 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

bash
URL="${MOBILITY_AGENT_URL:-https://212-47-77-33.sslip.io/}"
curl -s -X POST "$URL" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",