T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:26- Finding
Unverified Installation from Mutable Third-Party Sources
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill does what it claims, but it gives an agent broad Windows PowerShell control from WSL without enough scoping or confirmation safeguards.
Install only if you intentionally want an agent to run Windows PowerShell from WSL. Treat it as high-authority: require explicit approval for file writes, process killing, privilege elevation, script execution, and execution-policy bypass, and prefer a pinned, verified release rather than cloning the mutable main branch.
README.md:26Unverified Installation from Mutable Third-Party Sources
psctl.sh:180Implicit PowerShell Execution-Policy Bypass
The README prominently demonstrates commands that copy files, create files, start processes, stop processes, and perform network operations, but the warnings are generic and appear later rather than directly attached to risky examples. In an agent skill context, such examples can normalize or encourage execution of host-impacting Windows commands from WSL, making accidental destructive actions more likely.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
Issues and Pull Requests are welcome!
1. Fork the project
2. Create feature branch (`git checkout -b feature/AmazingFeature`)
3. Commit changes (`git commit -m 'Add some AmazingFeature'`)
4. Push to branch (`git push origin feature/AmazingFeature`)
5. Open Pull Request
The README says the agent can 'automatically use this skill based on user requests' but does not define narrow triggers, approval requirements, or safe operation boundaries. Because this skill bridges WSL to Windows PowerShell, vague activation criteria can cause an agent to invoke powerful host-level commands in response to loosely related prompts, increasing the chance of unintended system changes.
This skill explicitly enables execution of Windows PowerShell from WSL and includes examples for file copying, file creation, process termination, and privilege elevation. While the content appears instructional rather than overtly malicious, it meaningfully expands an agent's ability to modify the host system and could be abused to perform destructive or unauthorized actions if invoked without strong user consent and safety guardrails.
This code runs a provided script file via PowerShell and also executes a user-supplied command string directly. Although help text documents usage, it does not warn that execution may run arbitrary code on the Windows host, potentially affecting files or system state, and there is no confirmation prompt before execution.
The file presents its primary instructions and headings in Chinese, and there is no indication that language choice is optional or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking context. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.
The script's comments, help output, and operational messages are all presented only in Chinese. This imposes a specific language on users without offering a locale choice or documenting that the tool is intended for a Chinese-only environment.
No suspicious patterns detected.