T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Unverified Remote Binary Download and Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 17, 38-39, and 65-66
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution without integrity verification
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippets
Lines 17:
markdown 1. **If no binary** (`sitemd/sitemd` does not exist) — run `./sitemd/install` to download itLines 38-39:
markdown - `sitemd` — Compiled binary (run `./sitemd/sitemd launch`) - `install` — Bootstrap script (run `./sitemd/install` to download binary)Lines 65-66:
markdown | `sitemd_update_check` | Check for updates | | `sitemd_update_apply` | Apply updates |Technical Analysis
The Skill instructs the Agent to invoke a bootstrap script that downloads a compiled executable and subsequently launches that executable. It also exposes an update mechanism capable of replacing or modifying the installed software.
The submitted package contains only
SKILL.md; neither the referencedsitemd/installscript nor thesitemd/sitemdbinary is available for inspection. The instructions do not specify:- The remote download endpoint.
- A pinned binary version.
- An expected cryptographic digest.
- A digital signature and trusted signing key.
- The identity of the binary publisher.
- Integrity or authenticity verification for updates.
- An explicit approval boundary before downloaded code is executed.
Consequently, the effective executable payload is outside the reviewed Skill and may change after the Skill itself has been audited. If the installer, hosting infrastructure, DNS resolution, release account, or update channel is compromised, an attacker could substitute a malicious binary while preserving the legitimate-looking Skill instructions.
The absence of the referenced installer from the submitted artifact also means its download behavior, command construction, destination handling, and treatment of environment variables cannot be verified.
Attack Path
- An Agent loads the Skill an ...[truncated 1814 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include the complete installer source in the reviewed Skill package so its network, filesystem, and process behavior can be audited.
- Download releases only from an explicit HTTPS endpoint controlled by the verified publisher.
- Pin the downloaded binary to a specific immutable version rather than retrieving a mutable latest release.
- Publish a SHA-256 or stronger digest through a separately protected channel and verify it before execution.
- Digitally sign release artifacts and verify signatures against a pinned, trusted public key.
- Abort installation or updating if any version, digest, or signature check fails.
- Apply the same authenticity and integrity controls to
sitemd_update_apply. - Display the source URL, version, expected digest, destination, and requested action before downloading, and require explicit user approval before first execution or update.
- Run the installer and binary with least privilege and restrict their filesystem, network, and environment-variable access where possible.
- Avoid exposing
SITEMD_TOKENor unrelated credentials to installation and update processes unless they are strictly necessary. - Maintain an auditable release manifest and document the publisher, update endpoint, signing procedure, and rollback process.
