T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:42- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 42 and 51
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies
Risk Level: MediumComplete Code Snippet
bash pip install ollama-herdbash uv tool install "mlx-qwen3-asr[serve]" --python 3.14Technical Analysis
The setup instructions install
ollama-herdandmlx-qwen3-asr[serve]without exact version constraints, lockfiles, hashes, or signature verification. Consequently, installations can resolve to package versions and transitive dependencies that differ from those reviewed when the skill was published.The documented package and repository references point to PyPI and GitHub rather than an evidently malicious source. However, the downloaded packages are not included in this project, so their source code and transitive dependency graphs could not be verified during this audit. This is a supply-chain exposure rather than evidence that the current packages are malicious.
Python package installation and subsequent execution can run third-party code under the installing user's account. A compromised publisher account, malicious future release, or compromised transitive dependency could therefore convert these setup commands into a code-execution path.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises an upstream publisher account, package release process, or transitive dependency.
- The attacker publishes a malicious release under a package name used by the setup instructions.
- A user follows the documented unpinned installation command.
- The package manager resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release.
- Malicious code executes during installation or when the installed application is launched.
- The payload acts with the privileges and data access of the user running the command.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the installing user's privileges. Th ...[truncated 372 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version.
- Publish and use a lockfile that records resolved transitive dependency versions.
- Require package hashes, such as with pip's
--require-hashes, to verify artifact integrity. - Review the source, release provenance, and dependency graph before updating pinned versions.
- Prefer signed releases or provenance attestations where supported.
- Install packages in a dedicated virtual environment or another isolated, least-privilege environment.
- Avoid administrator or root installation unless it is strictly necessary.
- Document a controlled update process that includes security review and regression testing before changing dependency pins.
