T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:28- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation and Immediate Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 28–30
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: Mediumbash pip install ollama-herd # PyPI: https://pypi.org/project/ollama-herd/ herd # start the router (port 11435) herd-node # run on each device — finds the router automaticallyTechnical Analysis
The Quick Start instructions install the latest available
ollama-herdpackage from PyPI without pinning a reviewed version or verifying package integrity with cryptographic hashes. They then instruct the user to execute the package-providedherdandherd-nodeentry points.Consequently, the code that runs may differ from the code reviewed when the Skill was published. Although the package name and linked repository are consistent with the Skill's declared functionality, an attacker who compromises the publisher account, package release process, dependency chain, or package index delivery path could substitute malicious code.
This is not direct evidence that the current package is malicious. It is a supply-chain hardening deficiency that creates mutable, externally controlled code execution.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the
ollama-herdPyPI publisher account, release pipeline, package artifact, or a transitive dependency. - The attacker publishes or causes delivery of a malicious package version.
- A user follows the documented
pip install ollama-herdinstruction. - Because no version or hashes are specified,
pipinstalls the currently selected mutable release and its dependencies. - The user runs
herdorherd-node, activating attacker-controlled code. - The malicious code operates with the permissions and accessible resources of the user who launched it.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could allow arbitrary code execution with the installing user's privileges. Depending on that user's environment, the co ...[truncated 504 chars]
- An attacker compromises the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
ollama-herdto a specifically reviewed version, for example:bash python3 -m pip install "ollama-herd==<reviewed-version>" - Publish SHA-256 hashes for the reviewed wheel and use hash-enforced installation:
bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt - Lock and review all transitive dependencies rather than allowing unconstrained resolution.
- Recommend installation in a dedicated virtual environment with ordinary user privileges:
bash python3 -m venv .venv . .venv/bin/activate python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt - Document the expected package publisher, source repository, release tag, and artifact hashes so users can verify provenance.
- Separate installation from execution and advise users to inspect or verify the installed artifact before invoking its entry points.
- Use signed releases or package provenance attestations where available, and establish a documented process for updating the pinned version after security review.
- Pin
