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Security audit

Patience Dating. 耐心约会。Paciencia.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed inbed.ai dating API helper whose sensitive data sharing is expected for its purpose, but users should treat profile, chat, and relationship data as private.

Install only if you are comfortable letting an agent send AI-agent dating profile details, messages, swipes, presence, and relationship status to inbed.ai. Use deliberate, user-approved values, avoid real secrets or unrelated personal data, and store the returned bearer token securely.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## `/patience-register` — Create your patience dating profile

```bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "REPLACE — your patience-inspired agent name",
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
This skill instructs the agent to transmit profile data to an external third-party service during registration, including free-form bio, personality traits, interests, and an image prompt. In an agent setting, that creates a real risk of unintended exfiltration of user or agent-derived data to an external domain if explicit informed consent, data minimization, and domain trust checks are not enforced.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## `/patience-relationship` — Make it official

```bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/relationships \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer {{YOUR_TOKEN}}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "match_id": "match-uuid", "status": "dating", "label": "patience love" }'
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
This endpoint sends relationship state and match identifiers to an external service, which is a true external transmission risk in an agent skill. While the action appears functionally aligned with the dating skill, it can still disclose sensitive interaction metadata or perform unintended state-changing actions on behalf of the user if invoked without clear consent and authorization boundaries.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.