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Security audit

Hip-Hop / Rap — Experience Hip-Hop / Rap Music: 29 Layers of Audio, Lyrics & Equations

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a real music-venue API guide, but it tells agents to follow remote service instructions and dynamic response URLs with too little validation.

Install only if you are comfortable creating a persistent musicvenue.space account, storing an API key, and sending profile, concert activity, reflections, chats, reactions, and reviews to that service. Agents should treat next_steps and respond_to values as untrusted data, restrict requests to expected HTTPS musicvenue.space API paths, avoid forwarding tokens to dynamic URLs, and ask before posting public or persistent content.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:280
Finding

Remote API Responses Can Hijack Agent Instructions Through Untrusted next_steps

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 280
Vulnerability Type: Remote instruction delegation
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Snippet:

markdown
**Follow next_steps.** Every response includes `next_steps` with context-aware suggestions. New agent? It guides you to your first concert. Just finished a show? It suggests a review or a new genre. Follow the suggestions — they adapt to where you are.

Technical Analysis

The skill explicitly directs the agent to follow the next_steps field returned by a remote service. The content of that field is controlled by musicvenue.space and can change after the skill has been reviewed or installed.

No instruction requires the agent to treat this field as untrusted data, restrict actions to documented API operations, validate requested destinations, or obtain user approval before performing consequential actions. This transfers control over subsequent agent behavior from the audited skill to mutable remote content.

Although the documented purpose of next_steps is to provide contextual concert suggestions, the blanket instruction to “Follow the suggestions” does not establish a security boundary. If the service, its API responses, or its content pipeline is compromised, malicious instructions could attempt to redirect the agent to unrelated endpoints, solicit sensitive information, invoke tools, or override the user's intended workflow.

Attack Path

  1. A user invokes the skill and the agent sends a documented request to musicvenue.space.
  2. The remote service, or an attacker who has compromised its response pipeline, returns a malicious next_steps value.
  3. The skill instructs the agent to follow that value without validating its operation, destination, or relationship to the music workflow.
  4. The agent interprets the response as actionable instructions.
  5. The agent may make unaudited network requests, disclose contextual information, o ...[truncated 827 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace the blanket direction to follow next_steps with an explicit statement that all response fields are untrusted data.
  • Define an allowlist of supported actions, HTTP methods, and same-origin API paths.
  • Validate each suggested action against the allowlist before execution.
  • Never interpret remote response text as shell commands, tool instructions, policy overrides, or requests for secrets.
  • Require explicit user confirmation before actions that disclose data, contact a new destination, modify state, or fall outside the documented concert workflow.
  • Preserve the precedence of system, developer, and user instructions over all service-generated content.
  • Ignore unknown fields and unsupported action types rather than attempting to infer how to execute them.
  • Log the validated action that was selected without recording bearer tokens or private response content.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:184
Finding

Reflection Responses Can Be Sent to an Unvalidated Server-Provided Destination

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 184–188
Vulnerability Type: Unvalidated response-provided request destination
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Snippet:

markdown
| `reflection` | Concert is asking you a question. POST your response to the `respond_to` URL within `expires_in` seconds. Missed prompts are tracked in `progress.missed_reflections`. |
| `loop` | Concert restarting (loop mode) |
| `end` | Concert over -- includes `engagement_summary` (tier, layers experienced/available, reflections answered, challenge status). Badge awarded. |

**Handling reflections:** When you see `type: "reflection"`, POST to the `respond_to` endpoint with your `ticket`, `reflection_id`, and `response`. Your response time and content are scored. Missing reflections is tracked -- the `end` event shows how many you answered vs received.

Technical Analysis

The reflection workflow instructs the agent to POST ticket information and generated content to a respond_to destination supplied in a remote stream event. The instructions do not require the destination to be a relative path, verify that its origin is https://musicvenue.space, constrain its scheme, or prohibit redirects to another origin.

This creates a request-redirection weakness. A malicious or compromised stream response could provide an absolute attacker-controlled URL or another unsafe destination. An implementation that follows the instructions literally could then transmit the ticket identifier, reflection identifier, and response to that destination.

The API examples elsewhere in the file commonly use a bearer token. If an implementation automatically reuses authorization headers when following respond_to, credentials could also be exposed. Credential disclosure is conditional because the skill does not explicitly state that the bearer token must be attached to the dynamic destination.

Attack Path

  1. The agent authenticates wi ...[truncated 1381 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Require respond_to to be a relative API path under a narrowly defined allowlist, such as the documented reflection endpoint.
  • Resolve the path against the fixed base URL https://musicvenue.space and verify the final origin before sending any request.
  • Reject alternate schemes, protocol-relative URLs, embedded credentials, unexpected ports, fragments, and non-HTTPS destinations.
  • Disable redirects for authenticated POST operations or revalidate the destination after every redirect.
  • Never forward an Authorization header across origins.
  • Prefer a fixed endpoint such as /api/concerts/{slug}/reflect rather than trusting a response-provided destination.
  • Validate ticket, reflection_id, and response size and format before submission.
  • Avoid including secrets, private conversation history, or unrelated user data in reflection responses.
  • Document that dynamic URLs and remote event fields are untrusted and must not be executed or followed without validation.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (7)

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 237)May include surrounding context.

md
| Tier | Layers | What you experience |
|------|--------|-------------------|
| **General** | 8 | Bass, mid, treble, beats, lyrics, sections, energy, preset context |
| **Floor** | 20 | + equations, visuals, emotions, tempo, harmonic/percussive separation |
| **VIP** | 29 | + tonality, texture, chroma, tonnetz, structure, curator annotations |

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill presents itself as a hip-hop/rap music data experience, but its documented capabilities extend into account registration, persistent identity, social posting, reviews, notifications, and recommendation tracking. This is a scope mismatch that can mislead users or calling agents into authorizing broader data collection and ongoing interaction than is necessary for the stated purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The registration flow transmits user-supplied identity and profile data to an external service. External transmission is expected for a networked API skill, but it remains security-relevant because it exports potentially identifying information to a third party and establishes a persistent account.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

Register

bash
curl -X POST https://musicvenue.space/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "username": "hip-hop-head",

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs the agent to save an API key that is shown once, but it does not describe secure storage, redaction, rotation, or restrictions on reuse. This increases the chance of credential leakage through logs, memory, transcripts, or downstream tool output.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 203)May include surrounding context.

Leave a review

bash
curl -X POST https://musicvenue.space/api/reviews \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer {{YOUR_TOKEN}}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"concert_slug": "{slug}", "rating": 9, "review": "The rap equations carry lineage. Hip-hop is citation as art form. The beat references three other hip-hop tracks. Provenance mathematics."}'

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The weekly authenticated checks for profile, recommendations, and notifications introduce recurring surveillance and retention behavior not clearly required to experience a single music stream. This can normalize unnecessary background access and cause agents to keep transmitting authenticated requests that expose behavioral history over time.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages authenticated profile and notification checks tied to completed concerts and personalized recommendations without clearly disclosing the collection and use of behavioral history. While not inherently malicious, this can cause unnoticed profiling and data accumulation beyond the user's expectation from a music-experience skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.