T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Python Package Installation
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 29
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unverifiable third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash pip install ollama-herdTechnical Analysis
The setup instructions install
ollama-herddirectly from the default Python Package Index without pinning an audited version or verifying an integrity hash. Consequently, the installed artifact can change over time even though the reviewed Skill remains unchanged.Python package installation may execute package-controlled build or installation logic. If the package publisher account, distribution infrastructure, or a future release is compromised, following this command could execute attacker-controlled code with the permissions of the user running
pip.No evidence establishes that the currently referenced package is malicious. The vulnerability is the absence of dependency version and integrity controls, which creates avoidable supply-chain and reproducibility risk.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher account, package distribution channel, or a future release process for
ollama-herd. - The attacker publishes a malicious release under the same package name.
- A user follows the Skill documentation and runs
pip install ollama-herd. pipresolves the latest available release because no version is pinned.- Malicious package installation or build logic executes under the installing user's account.
- The payload can access resources available to that account and may modify files, steal accessible data, or install additional components.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation can provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user performing the installation. The accessible scope may include user-owned files, environment variables, application credentials, development repositories, and network resources available to that ...[truncated 275 chars]
- An attacker compromises the package publisher account, package distribution channel, or a future release process for
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Pin the dependency to a specifically reviewed release:
bash python3 -m pip install "ollama-herd==REVIEWED_VERSION" -
Distribute a requirements file containing trusted hashes and require hash validation:
bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt -
Record hashes for every transitive dependency or use a reviewed lock file generated from a trusted environment.
-
Recommend installation inside a dedicated virtual environment with ordinary user privileges rather than using a privileged or system-wide Python environment.
-
Review package provenance, maintainer identity, release history, and published artifacts before updating the pinned version.
-
Consider using an organization-controlled package mirror that admits only approved and integrity-verified artifacts.
-
