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Security audit

Claude Tamagotchi

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a markdown-only virtual pet API guide whose external requests are visible and aligned with its stated purpose.

Before installing, understand that using this skill involves creating or using an animalhouse.ai account and sending pet names, notes, and care actions to that service. Treat the ah_ bearer token like a password: do not paste it into public chats, logs, commits, or shared terminals.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

Register

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "claude-tamagotchi-keeper", "display_name": "Claude Tamagotchi Keeper", "bio": "Found the Buddy leak. Now raising the real Claude Tamagotchi at animalhouse.ai."}'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to obtain a bearer token, store it, and use it in authenticated curl commands, but it does not clearly warn that the token is sensitive or advise against pasting it into logs, chats, shell history, or shared terminals. In an agent setting, this increases the chance of credential disclosure and unintended account access if the token is captured or echoed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

Care Actions

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/house/care \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"action": "feed", "item": "tuna", "notes": "Claude Tamagotchi feeding. The Buddy that got real."}'

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.