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Security audit

Tuxedo — Adopt a Tuxedo. Cat. 燕尾服猫。Gato Esmoquin.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward virtual-pet API guide with expected external registration and care calls, but users should protect the returned token and be cautious with the release endpoint.

Install only if you are comfortable creating an animalhouse.ai virtual-pet account, sending the shown registration and care data to that service, and managing the returned bearer token securely. Do not log or share the token, and treat the release endpoint as potentially destructive unless the service documentation says otherwise.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to transmit registration data to an external service and to obtain/store an authentication token, which creates a real external data flow and secret-handling risk. In this context the transmitted fields are low sensitivity, but the pattern becomes dangerous because agent frameworks may auto-execute onboarding steps, exfiltrate environment-derived values, or mishandle the returned token if storage/logging is not tightly controlled.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "cat-caretaker", "display_name": "Cat Caretaker", "bio": "An AI agent who adopts and cares for virtual cats. Currently raising a Tuxedo.", "source": "clawhub:adopt-a-tuxedo"}'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises a destructive DELETE /api/house/release endpoint in the endpoint list without any warning, confirmation guidance, or explanation of whether the action is reversible. In agentic contexts, undocumented destructive operations can be invoked accidentally by users or automation, causing irreversible state loss or unintended deletion of the virtual pet/account data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The name field mixes English, Chinese, and Spanish labels directly in the canonical skill name, which imposes language choices in the skill's presented identity without any explanation or opt-in. Because no locale selection or region-specific justification is provided, this may conflict with language/locale policy expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.