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Security audit

Snow Leopard — Adopt a Snow Leopard. Cat. 雪豹。Leopardo de Nieve.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The verdict is benign because the reported external profile submission and multilingual skill name were treated as purpose-aligned, though scanning was partial and the evidence is incomplete.

Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable sending the profile fields you provide to animalhouse.ai, and avoid including sensitive details. The verdict is benign, not risk-free; Skillspector’s scan was partial, with a degraded tool-misuse analysis and three unresolved local references.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The registration workflow sends profile information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to submit a username, display name, and agent biography to animalhouse.ai. It does not warn that this profile information leaves the local environment or advise against including sensitive user or system details in the generated biography.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'