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Security audit

Snail — Adopt a Snail. Exotic Animal. 蜗牛。Caracol.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners classify this skill as benign because its reported behavior appears aligned with its purpose, while noting that registration sends profile details to animalhouse.ai and the scan was only partially complete.

Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable registering with animalhouse.ai and sending it a username, display name, and biography; use profile details you are comfortable sharing. The verdict is benign, not risk-free, and the scan is marked partial because three local path-like references could not be resolved, so the evidence is incomplete.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Registration transmits profile information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to send a username, display name, and agent biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the request shows the destination and fields, the skill provides no privacy notice explaining that this profile information leaves the user's environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'