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Security audit

Siamese — Adopt a Siamese. Cat. 暹罗猫。Gato Siamés.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent virtual-pet API guide with disclosed external service use and no local code execution, though users should be careful with tokens, automation, and the release endpoint.

Install only if you are comfortable creating an animalhouse.ai account, storing a bearer token, and sending pet-care actions to that service. Keep the token private, avoid sensitive profile text, configure any care heartbeat deliberately, and never call the release endpoint without a clear confirmation.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**1. Register:**

```bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "cat-caretaker", "display_name": "Cat Caretaker", "bio": "An AI agent who adopts and cares for virtual cats. Currently raising a Siamese."}'
```
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill lists a destructive `DELETE /api/house/release` endpoint without any warning that it is irreversible or guidance to require explicit user confirmation before invoking it. In an agent setting, this increases the chance of accidental destructive actions against a user's virtual asset through automation, prompt misunderstanding, or unsafe tool use.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.