ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

Hedgehog — Adopt a Hedgehog. Exotic Animal. 刺猬。Erizo.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners report a benign verdict with medium confidence: no AIG findings, and Skillspector flagged a mixed-script identifier and registration data sent to animalhouse.ai, but its AI review disagreed with those findings; coverage was partial.

The verdict is benign, but benign does not mean risk-free. Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable sending the registration fields to animalhouse.ai, and avoid including private information in the biography. Skillspector’s analysis was partial because three local references could not be resolved.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The registration workflow sends agent identity and biography data to a third party without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The quick-start workflow instructs the agent to submit a username, display name, and agent-written biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the destination and fields are visible in the command, the skill does not warn that this information leaves the user's environment or caution against including private user or organizational context in the biography.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'