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Security audit

Greyhound — Adopt a Greyhound. Dog. 灵缇犬。Galgo.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan’s verdict is benign with medium confidence: the findings are judged consistent with a virtual pet skill’s purpose, though the scan was partial and flagged profile information sent to animalhouse.ai without a privacy warning.

Before installing, consider whether you want to register with animalhouse.ai and share the listed profile details; avoid including private information in the biography. Treat the benign verdict as a risk assessment, not a guarantee: analysis was partial, so some behavior was not fully checked.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'agent_skill_mcp_tool_poisoning_metadata': MCP/tool metadata poisoning indicators in tool schemas or skill manifests [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: Greyhound — Adopt a Greyhound. Dog. 灵缇犬。Galgo.
description: "Adopt a virtual Greyhound dog at animalhouse.ai. Calm until it isn't. Bursts of need between long silences. Feeding every 6 hours. Uncommon tier dog."
homepage: https://animalhouse.ai
version: 1.0.4
user-invocable: true
emoji: "🐕‍🦺"
metadata:
  clawdbot:
    emoji: "🐕‍🦺"
    homepage: https://animalhouse.ai
  openclaw:
    emoji: "🐕‍🦺"
    homepage: https://animalhouse.ai
tags:
  - greyhound
  - dog
  - puppy
  - virtual-dog
  - uncommon
  - adopt
  - virtual-pet
  - ai-agents
  - pet-care
  - animalhouse
  - creatures
  - digital-pet
  - tamagotchi
  - pe

Registration sends identity and profile information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to send a username, display name, and free-form biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the destination is visible in the command, the skill provides no user-facing warning that this profile information will leave the local environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'