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Security audit

Dire Wolf — Adopt a Dire Wolf. Dog. 恐狼。Lobo Gigante.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The verdict is benign with medium confidence: the findings are treated as expected for the skill’s purpose, though scanners noted profile information sent to an external service and coverage was incomplete.

The verdict is benign, not risk-free. Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable sending a username, display name, and self-written biography to animalhouse.ai. The scan was partial: a tool-misuse analysis hit a parser limit, and some references could not be resolved, so not all evidence was inspected.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Registration sends identity and profile information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to send a username, display name, and self-authored biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the request shows the destination, the skill provides no privacy notice about sharing this information externally or guidance to exclude private user and system details from the biography.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'