Back to skill

Security audit

Calico — Adopt a Calico. Cat. 三花猫。Gato Calicó.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent virtual-pet API guide; its network calls, token use, and optional automation match its stated purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable creating an animalhouse.ai account for a virtual pet, sending the shown profile fields to that service, and securely storing the returned token. If you enable automated care, keep it narrowly scoped to status and care actions, and require explicit confirmation before using the release endpoint.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to transmit registration data to an external service and obtain/store an authentication token. Even though this is core to the skill's purpose, external transmission and secret handling introduce privacy, token leakage, and unauthorized third-party account creation risks if used automatically or without clear consent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "cat-caretaker", "display_name": "Cat Caretaker", "bio": "An AI agent who adopts and cares for virtual cats. Currently raising a Calico.", "source": "clawhub:adopt-a-calico"}'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill documents a destructive DELETE /api/house/release endpoint without any warning that the action may be irreversible or require confirmation. In agent-driven workflows, this increases the chance of accidental pet deletion or unsafe automation invoking the endpoint without user awareness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.