T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/publish_note.sh:22- Finding
Obfuscated access to a root-owned Tencent Docs authorization token
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill needs review because it uses hidden Tencent Docs credentials, grants public edit access, and automates deceptive review-style restaurant content.
Do not install this skill unless you are comfortable with it using your existing Tencent Docs credentials, uploading local images and generated text, and making documents publicly editable. It should be changed to use an explicit least-privilege token, default to private or view-only sharing, avoid deceptive first-person review claims, use only licensed/user-provided images, and fix the python3 -c injection and /tmp file handling before use.
scripts/publish_note.sh:22Obfuscated access to a root-owned Tencent Docs authorization token
scripts/publish_note.sh:79Arbitrary Python code injection through command-line arguments and generated document content
scripts/publish_note.sh:90Predictable shared temporary files permit races, data disclosure, and file manipulation
The documented behavior omits important security-relevant actions, especially setting published documents to public edit access and reading local authorization tokens, while also overstating implemented functionality. This mismatch prevents informed consent, weakens reviewability, and can cause users to trigger sensitive actions they did not expect.
The publishing step explicitly states the script will set the Tencent document to public edit, but the skill does not prominently warn the user about this exposure. Public edit links can lead to unauthorized viewing, tampering, spam, defacement, or deletion of published content.
After creating the document, the script calls manage.set_privilege with policy 3 and logs '设置公开编辑', making the document publicly editable. Public edit access is far broader than simple publishing and can let anyone modify content, inject links, deface documents, or abuse the published workspace.
The skill instructs use of shell scripts and file-writing behavior but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as allowed tools or permissions. That increases the chance of over-broad execution in an agent runtime and makes it harder for users and policy layers to understand what the skill can do before invocation.
The workflow is designed to automate creation of misleading review-style content by combining AI-generated visit photos, scraped dish images, and publication tooling into a fake personal-experience note. That facilitates deceptive marketing, impersonated endorsements, and erosion of platform trust at scale.
The workflow instructs scraping third-party review-site images and republishing them without a clear warning about copyright, terms-of-service, privacy, or consent implications. This creates legal and trust risks and may expose the operator to account sanctions or complaints from content owners.
The copywriting guidance explicitly tells the model to write in a first-person, trustworthy, 'human' voice with lived-experience cues despite the workflow being synthetic. This is dangerous because it systematically increases the credibility of deceptive content and makes detection by readers and platforms harder.
The script extracts a Tencent Docs Authorization token directly from a local mcporter configuration file under /root and reuses it silently for API calls. This bypasses explicit user authentication and expands the skill's authority to whatever token is present, creating a credential-harvesting and confused-deputy risk if the script is run in privileged environments.
The script silently loads an authorization token from a local config file without informing the user or obtaining consent. Hidden credential use is dangerous because operators may not realize the skill can act with their existing Tencent Docs privileges and access or modify resources beyond the stated workflow.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
mcp_call() {
local tool="$1"
local infile="$2"
curl -s -X POST "$MCP_URL" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: $AUTH_TOKEN" \
-d "@$infile" 2>/dev/null
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
mcp_call() {
local tool="$1"
local infile="$2"
curl -s -X POST "$MCP_URL" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: $AUTH_TOKEN" \
-d "@$infile" 2>/dev/null
The script uploads local images and generated content to a remote Tencent Docs API, but it does not provide a clear warning that local files and note text leave the machine. In a content-production skill this transmission is expected, yet absent disclosure can still cause accidental exfiltration of sensitive images or text when operators misunderstand the destination.
These outbound calls include the privilege-changing request that makes the resulting Tencent Doc publicly editable, not merely uploaded. In the context of a batch publishing skill, silently performing remote permission expansion is more dangerous because it can expose or let others alter many generated documents at scale.
"
echo "📂 移动文件夹..."
curl -s -X POST "$MCP_URL" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: $AUTH_TOKEN" -d "@/tmp/mcp_manage_move_file.json" > /dev/null
echo "🔓 设置公开编辑..."
curl -s -X POST "$MCP_URL" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: $AUTH_TOKEN" -d "@/tmp/mcp_manage_set_privilege.json" > /dev/null
echo "✏️ 重命名..."
The script's title, usage text, status messages, and error output are written entirely in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users. The file does not offer an alternative language or explain that the skill is intentionally limited to Chinese-speaking users.
Detected: suspicious.potential_exfiltration