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Security audit

OData Service

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly coherent for OData work, but it ships unnecessary Python bytecode that should be reviewed or removed before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable with a skill that can read from and modify configured OData services using your environment-provided credentials. Review or remove the bundled __pycache__ bytecode before use, configure profiles with environment-variable names rather than secret values, and require explicit confirmation for any write, delete, batch, action, or stream update.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (25)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents a fully functional OData client/integration skill that can communicate with OData services and perform both read and write protocol operations. The supplied code does none of that. It only manages local service profiles: parses CLI arguments, validates profile fields, stores profile metadata in a config file, lists and shows profiles, changes the default profile, and removes profiles. Although the profiles contain OData-related fields like service root and version, this is only preparatory configuration and not actual OData service interaction. The code also writes to a local config file, which is a materially different behavior from the declared service-operation focus. Therefore the description does not accurately represent this code chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents a comprehensive OData v4 client capable of interacting with OData services across read and write scenarios. The supplied code chunk, however, is only a test module focused on configuration profile persistence and argument resolution for a script named odata_profiles.py. It does not perform network requests, discover models, query entities, modify data, invoke OData actions/functions, or handle batch/asynchronous requests. While profile/config support could be a supporting detail for an OData client, this chunk’s actual purpose is materially narrower and different from the declared end-user functionality, so the description does not accurately represent what this code actually does.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
config.py list` and use its default profile. Read [references/configuration.md](references/configuration.md) when no endpoint is available or the user wants to

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

md
, navigation, containment, capabilities, addressing, or ordinary queries, read [references/model-and-query.md](references/model-and-query.md).

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md
, or `$ref` relationship changes, read [references/writes-and-relationships.md](references/writes-and-relationships.md).

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

md
s, preferences, or `respond-async`, read [references/operations-batch-async.md](references/operations-batch-async.md).

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md
- For media entities, stream properties, delta tracking, or synchronization, read [references/streams-and-delta.md](references/streams-and-delta.md).

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
- For response interpretation, errors, retries, versions, and normative links, read [references/protocol-and-errors.md](references/protocol-and-errors.md).

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

md
The dependency-free `scripts/odata_request.py` can issue guarded OData HTTP requests, inspect service/metadata endpoints, and traverse JSON collection pages. Ru

Skill ships a __pycache__ directory that normal discovery skips

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Skill ships Python bytecode (pycache/ or .pyc/.pyo). Discovery skips these paths, so malicious bytecode can score SAFE while decoy sources look clean.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/__pycache__/ (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

text
Python may load .pyc from this directory even when decoy .py sources look clean (PEP 552 UNCHECKED_HASH).

Skill ships Python bytecode (.pyc/.pyo) that normal analysis skips

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Skill ships Python bytecode (pycache/ or .pyc/.pyo). Discovery skips these paths, so malicious bytecode can score SAFE while decoy sources look clean.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/__pycache__/odata_request.cpython-313.pyc (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

text
Bytecode is excluded from content analysis; a malicious .pyc can execute while source decoys remain clean.

Skill ships a __pycache__ directory that normal discovery skips

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Skill ships Python bytecode (pycache/ or .pyc/.pyo). Discovery skips these paths, so malicious bytecode can score SAFE while decoy sources look clean.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/__pycache__/ (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

text
Python may load .pyc from this directory even when decoy .py sources look clean (PEP 552 UNCHECKED_HASH).

Skill ships Python bytecode (.pyc/.pyo) that normal analysis skips

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Skill ships Python bytecode (pycache/ or .pyc/.pyo). Discovery skips these paths, so malicious bytecode can score SAFE while decoy sources look clean.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/__pycache__/test_odata_request.cpython-313.pyc (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

text
Bytecode is excluded from content analysis; a malicious .pyc can execute while source decoys remain clean.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The skill text directs use of shell, network, environment variables, and local configuration/scripts but does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. In an agent environment, missing scope declarations can let the skill access broader capabilities than users or reviewers expect, increasing the chance of unintended network calls, config changes, or secret exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/configuration.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

Bearer token profile:

text
python scripts/odata_config.py set production --service-root https://api.example.com/odata/ --odata-version 4.0 --bearer-env PROD_ODATA_TOKEN --default

API-key/custom-header profile:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/configuration.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

API-key/custom-header profile:

text
python scripts/odata_config.py set warehouse --service-root https://data.example.com/odata/ --header-env X-API-Key=WAREHOUSE_API_KEY

Basic authentication profile:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_odata_profiles.py (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

python
path = pathlib.Path(temp_dir) / "services.json"
            value = profiles.empty_config()
            value["profiles"]["production"] = {
                "service_root": "https://api.example.test/odata",
                "odata_version": "4.01",
                "bearer_env": "PROD_ODATA_TOKEN",
                "headers_from_env": {"X-Tenant": "PROD_TENANT"},

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_odata_profiles.py (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

python
path = pathlib.Path(temp_dir) / "services.json"
            value = profiles.empty_config()
            value["profiles"]["production"] = {
                "service_root": "https://api.example.test/odata",
                "odata_version": "4.01",
                "bearer_env": "PROD_ODATA_TOKEN",
                "headers_from_env": {"X-Tenant": "PROD_TENANT"},

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_odata_profiles.py (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

python
path = pathlib.Path(temp_dir) / "services.json"
            value = profiles.empty_config()
            value["profiles"]["production"] = {
                "service_root": "https://api.example.test/odata",
                "odata_version": "4.01",
                "bearer_env": "PROD_ODATA_TOKEN",
                "headers_from_env": {"X-Tenant": "PROD_TENANT"},

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_odata_profiles.py (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

python
path = pathlib.Path(temp_dir) / "services.json"
            value = profiles.empty_config()
            value["profiles"]["production"] = {
                "service_root": "https://api.example.test/odata",
                "odata_version": "4.01",
                "bearer_env": "PROD_ODATA_TOKEN",
                "headers_from_env": {"X-Tenant": "PROD_TENANT"},

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_odata_profiles.py (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

python
path = pathlib.Path(temp_dir) / "services.json"
            value = profiles.empty_config()
            value["profiles"]["production"] = {
                "service_root": "https://api.example.test/odata",
                "odata_version": "4.01",
                "bearer_env": "PROD_ODATA_TOKEN",
                "headers_from_env": {"X-Tenant": "PROD_TENANT"},

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/odata_config.py (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

python
"headers_from_env": parse_headers(args.header_env),
    }
    for field in ("bearer_env", "basic_user_env", "basic_password_env"):
        option = getattr(args, field)
        if option:
            profile[field] = option
    value["profiles"][args.name] = validate_profile(args.name, profile)

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The remove command deletes a named profile and persists the modified configuration with save_config, which is a potentially destructive file write. While the command name suggests deletion, this function contains no confirmation prompt or in-code warning/comment about the irreversible effect on stored profile definitions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/odata_profiles.py (reported line 159)May include surrounding context.

python
args.service_root = profile["service_root"]
    args.odata_version = args.odata_version or profile.get("odata_version", "4.0")
    for field in ("bearer_env", "basic_user_env", "basic_password_env"):
        if not getattr(args, field, None):
            setattr(args, field, profile.get(field))
    configured_headers = [f"{name}={env_name}" for name, env_name in profile.get("headers_from_env", {}).items()]
    args.header_env = configured_headers + list(getattr(args, "header_env", []))

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/odata_request.py (reported line 424)May include surrounding context.

python
parser = build_parser()
    args = parser.parse_args()
    for name in ("timeout", "max_response_bytes", "max_pages", "max_items"):
        value = getattr(args, name, 1)
        if value <= 0:
            parser.error(f"--{name.replace('_', '-')} must be positive")
    try: