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Security audit

content-strategy

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a coherent content-strategy planner, but it instructs agents to execute an unbundled validator from the active skills root without clear provenance checks.

Install only if you trust the surrounding Groundcrew skills root and can verify the `groundcrew-doctor.py` file it will execute. Expect it to read SEO/content evidence and optionally use configured third-party SEO or analytics connectors; keep API keys scoped and do not approve paid batches or TrustGrowth actions unless you understand them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:10
Finding

Execution of an Unverified External Validator

Content
View full analysis
/.groundcrew/groundcrew-doctor.py --evidence ` before using them in a conclusion. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the agent to locate and execute `groundcrew-doctor.py` from an external “active skills root.” This executable is not included in the audited project, and the instruction does not require verification of its provenance, version, cryptographic integrity, ownership, permissions, canonical path, or symlink status. Consequently, the code executed at runtime is determined by the contents of another directory outside this package's reviewed trust boundary. A malicious or compromised skills installation could replace the expected validator with attacker-controlled Python code while retaining the legitimate-looking filename and path. This is an insecure supply-chain dependency rather than confirmed embedded malware: the audited project does not itself contain the referenced executable, and no malicious implementation was observed. Exploitation therefore depends on an attacker being able to influence the selected skills root or replace the validator within it. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker gains the ability to create or modify `.groundcrew/groundcrew-doctor.py` beneath a directory that may be selected as the active skills root. This could occur through a compromised Skill bundle, unsafe installation process, writable shared directory, or lo ...[truncated 1303 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/connectors.md (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Tier 1.** Google Suggest for expansion (unofficial endpoint; treat as hints, `confidence: low`). A SERP the user pastes or fetches is an observation for that query, locale, device, and date — record all four.
- **DataForSEO.** Paid, per-request. Read `dataforseo.md`; show the cost preflight and get approval for each batch.
- **Ahrefs MCP** (`https://api.ahrefs.com/mcp/mcp`, API key on a plan that includes MCP) and **Semrush MCP** (`https://mcp.semrush.com/v1/mcp`, OAuth or API key). Use only when the user already pays for the tool and has configured the MCP in their client. Label rows `source: "ahrefs"` / `"semrush"`, `confidence` per the vendor's own accuracy notes; these are third-party estimates, not the user's own data.
- **TrustGrowth.** `keywords` (typed opportunities with volume, difficulty, intent, current position, scores) for the verified site. SERP snapshots per keyword are scheduled (TEC-7796).

### `~~link database` — backlinks and authority

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.