Shop from Apple - With your creditcard

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 3:41 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

The skill is mostly a disclosed shopping/payment integration, but it also gives agents high-impact money movement authority, including an under-disclosed ability to create payment links to charge third parties.

Install only if you intentionally want an agent to make real purchases and possibly create payment links. Keep `CREDITCLAW_API_KEY` in a secure secret store, enable the strictest approval mode, set low per-transaction/daily/monthly limits, disable or tightly restrict payment-link creation if you do not need receivables, and ensure any shipping addresses or payer emails are shared with clear user consent.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence
• YARA Signatures: Malware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection

Findings (32)

YARA rule 'agent_skill_prompt_injection_hidden_instructions': Prompt injection or hidden instructions embedded in AI agent skill text [agent_skills]

High

• Category: YARA Match
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md

rsion: 2.3.1
updated: 2026-02-23T00:00:00Z
description: "Let your agent shop online with guardrailed wallets, multiple payment methods, and owner approval."
homepage: https://creditclaw.com
api_base: https://creditclaw.com/api/v1
credentials: [CREDITCLAW_API_KEY]
metadata: {"openclaw":{"requires":{"env":["CREDITCLAW_API_KEY"]},"primaryEnv":"CREDITCLAW_API_KEY"}}
---

# CreditClaw — Shopping for AI Agents

CreditClaw lets your agent buy things online — Amazon products, Shopify stores, SaaS subscriptions, and more.
Your owner funds a wallet, sets spending limits, and you shop within those guardrails.

## Skill Files

| File | URL | Purpose |
|------|-----|---------|
| **SKILL.md** (this file) | `https://creditclaw.com/creditcard/skill.md` | Registration, setup, payment method guide, and API reference |
| **SHOPPING.md** | `https://creditclaw.com/creditcard/shopping.md` | General purchasing guide — merchant types, tips, common patterns |
| **AMAZON.md** | `https://creditclaw.com/cre

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · amazon.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

Purchase Request

bash

curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/card-wallet/bot/purchase \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 85% confidence

Finding

This markdown file includes executable curl examples that transmit an Authorization bearer token from the sensitive environment variable CREDITCLAW_API_KEY. While the examples show how to authenticate, the document does not warn users that these commands use a credential or advise safe handling of that secret, which is a missing user-facing warning under the markdown criteria.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · heartbeat.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

1. Check Full Status (Recommended)

bash

curl https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/status \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY"

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

This routine directs the agent to send a state-changing top-up request automatically when balance is low, which can trigger external workflow effects and notify or pressure the owner without explicit approval at execution time. In a purchasing/payment skill, automatic financial-action requests are more sensitive because they can generate unintended spend-related operations or social-engineering style nudges on a recurring heartbeat.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · heartbeat.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

Before an expensive self-hosted card purchase, test if it would pass:

bash

curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/check/rail4/test \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "merchant_name": "Amazon", "amount_cents": 5000, "profile_index": 1 }'

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 92% confidence

Finding

The purchase example instructs users to send a full shipping address, product details, and an API credential to a third-party purchasing service, but it does not explicitly warn that personal data will be transmitted onward to CreditClaw and likely merchants/logistics providers. In a payment and shopping context, omission of a privacy/data-sharing warning can mislead integrators into handling sensitive personal data without adequate notice, consent, or minimization controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 84% confidence

Finding

This example performs an external API call that transmits sensitive information, including an authorization bearer token and a recipient shipping address, to a remote service. External transmission is expected for the feature, but in this context it is still security-relevant because the documentation normalizes sending secrets and PII without nearby cautions about secure handling, redaction, or consent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prepaid-wallet.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

Purchase Request

bash

curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/card-wallet/bot/purchase \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prepaid-wallet.md (reported line 98)May include surrounding context.

Step 1: Search for Variants

bash

curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/card-wallet/bot/search \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "product_url": "https://shop.example.com/products/widget" }'

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 88% confidence

Finding

The documentation describes a system where purchases may be auto-approved within an allowance, allowing an agent to trigger real-world financial transactions without per-transaction human review. In a payment skill, autonomous action is materially risky because the agent may act on manipulated inputs, misunderstand user intent, or repeatedly spend within the threshold.

Content

Scanner excerpt · self-hosted-card.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md

## How It Works

Self-hosted cards use a split-knowledge privacy model. Your owner provides their own card details through CreditClaw's secure setup wizard — you never see the actual card numbers. When you need to make a purchase at any online merchant, you submit a checkout request. CreditClaw evaluates it against your card's permissions and either auto-approves (if within your allowance) or sends your owner an approval request via email.

**Use this rail for:** Any online store — SaaS subscriptions, cloud hosting, domain registrations, digital services, or any merchant not covered by the Pre-paid Wallet.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

This flow states that if an amount is within the auto-approved allowance, processing happens immediately, which gives the agent authority to commit funds without a human in the loop. The surrounding context makes this more dangerous, not less, because the rail is intended for broad online merchant use, increasing the chance of misuse across many services.

Content

Scanner excerpt · self-hosted-card.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md

1. You submit a checkout request with merchant and amount details
2. CreditClaw evaluates the request against your card's permissions
3. If the amount is within your auto-approved allowance, it processes immediately
4. If the amount exceeds the threshold, your owner receives an approval request (email with secure link)
5. You poll for the result
6. Once approved, the transaction is recorded

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 92% confidence

Finding

The skill explicitly instructs an agent to transmit merchant, purchase, and authorization data to an external payment API to complete transactions. Even though this is the advertised purpose of the skill, it enables real-money spending at arbitrary online merchants, so any prompt injection, task confusion, or misuse by the agent could lead to unauthorized purchases or financial loss.

Content

Scanner excerpt · self-hosted-card.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

Checkout Request

bash

curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/merchant/checkout \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

The auto-approved response format confirms that the system is designed to complete transactions automatically when policy thresholds are met. While not malicious by itself, this operationalizes autonomous spending and may encourage downstream agent implementations to treat approval as routine rather than exceptional, increasing the chance of unauthorized or unintended purchases.

Content

Scanner excerpt · self-hosted-card.md (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

| category | No | Spending category | | task_id | No | Your internal task reference |

Response (Auto-Approved — Within Allowance)

json

{

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 89% confidence

Finding

Allowance thresholds that permit no-confirmation purchases create a standing permission for autonomous spending. In this skill's context—shopping at essentially any online store—that materially expands the blast radius of prompt injection, compromised agent logic, or accidental repeated purchases.

Content

Scanner excerpt · self-hosted-card.md (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

md

## Allowance Thresholds

Your owner sets a per-profile allowance threshold for each card. Purchases within this threshold are auto-approved — no email confirmation needed. Purchases above it require human approval via a secure email link (15-minute TTL).

Your owner can view and adjust these thresholds from their dashboard at `https://creditclaw.com/app/self-hosted`.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 85% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · shopping.md (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

1. Check wallet & spending permissions
2. Confirm purchase details with the user
3. Submit purchase/checkout request
4. Handle approval (auto-approved or pending owner approval)
5. Poll for result if pending
6. Report outcome to user (tracking info, confirmation, or error)

text

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 85% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 339)May include surrounding context.

1. Check wallet & spending permissions
2. Confirm purchase details with the user
3. Submit purchase/checkout request
4. Handle approval (auto-approved or pending owner approval)
5. Poll for result if pending
6. Report outcome to user (tracking info, confirmation, or error)

text

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

Follow your human's instructions on how to manage and save skill files. If unsure, you can install locally:

bash

mkdir -p ~/.creditclaw/skills/creditcard
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/creditcard/skill.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/creditcard/SKILL.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/creditcard/shopping.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/creditcard/SHOPPING.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/creditcard/amazon.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/creditcard/AMAZON.md

Skill Enumeration

Medium

• Category: Agent Snooping
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

Follow your human's instructions on how to manage and save skill files. If unsure, you can install locally:

bash

mkdir -p ~/.creditclaw/skills/creditcard
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/creditcard/skill.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/creditcard/SKILL.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/creditcard/shopping.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/creditcard/SHOPPING.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/creditcard/amazon.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/creditcard/AMAZON.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/creditcard/prepaid-wallet.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/creditcard/PREPAID-WALLET.md

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

Register to get your API key and a claim token for your human.

bash

curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bots/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "bot_name": "my-research-bot",

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 223)May include surrounding context.

Recommended interval: every 30 minutes, or before any purchase.

bash

curl https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/status \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY"

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 274)May include surrounding context.

"cash_advances" ], "recurring_allowed": false, "notes": "Prefer free tiers before paying. Always check for discount codes. No annual plans without asking me first.", "updated_at": "2026-02-06T18:00:00Z" }

text

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

The skill explicitly supports autonomous spending under configured thresholds, allowing the agent to spend without real-time owner approval. While this is an intended feature, it is still a genuine risk surface because prompt injection, task confusion, or compromised agent behavior could trigger valid-but-undesired purchases within those limits.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 281)May include surrounding context.

md

**You must follow these rules:**
- If `approval_mode` is `ask_for_everything`, ask your human before any purchase to get their approval. **New accounts default to this mode.** Your owner can loosen this from their dashboard once they're comfortable.
- If `approval_mode` is `auto_approve_under_threshold`, you may spend freely up to `ask_approval_above_usd`. Anything above that requires owner approval.
- If `approval_mode` is `auto_approve_by_category`, you may spend freely on `approved_categories` within limits. All others require approval.
- **Never** spend on `blocked_categories`. These are hard blocks enforced server-side and will be declined.
- Always read and follow the `notes` field — these are your owner's direct instructions.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

Category-based auto-approval permits autonomous purchases in preapproved categories, which still creates financial risk if the agent is manipulated into making unnecessary or adversarially induced purchases that technically fit the category. The context lowers risk somewhat because server-side guardrails exist, but those guardrails do not prevent misuse within allowed bounds.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 282)May include surrounding context.

md

**You must follow these rules:**
- If `approval_mode` is `ask_for_everything`, ask your human before any purchase to get their approval. **New accounts default to this mode.** Your owner can loosen this from their dashboard once they're comfortable.
- If `approval_mode` is `auto_approve_under_threshold`, you may spend freely up to `ask_approval_above_usd`. Anything above that requires owner approval.
- If `approval_mode` is `auto_approve_by_category`, you may spend freely on `approved_categories` within limits. All others require approval.
- **Never** spend on `blocked_categories`. These are hard blocks enforced server-side and will be declined.
- Always read and follow the `notes` field — these are your owner's direct instructions.
- Cache this for up to 30 minutes. Do not fetch before every micro-purchase.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 351)May include surrounding context.

When your balance is low, ask your human if they'd like you to request a top-up:

bash

curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/wallet/topup-request \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The skill is presented as an owner-approved shopping/payment tool, but it also exposes a capability to generate Stripe payment links for arbitrary third parties. That materially expands the trust boundary from spending the owner's funds to operating as a payment-collection surface, which could be abused for unauthorized billing, spam invoicing, or social-engineering workflows not implied by the manifest.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.