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Security audit

AMEX | Give your Agent your CreditCard

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a real financial/shopping integration, but it asks agents to handle live payment authority and plaintext card details in ways that deserve careful review before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill live financial authority and having an agent handle payment-card material. Keep approval mode set to ask for every purchase unless you have strong limits, use a secure secrets manager for CREDITCLAW_API_KEY and webhook secrets, avoid main-agent card checkout, review any downloaded or delivered card files before use, and do not run the curl-based install/update flow without your own checksum or signature controls.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
encrypted-card.md:80
Finding

Remote Server Supplies Executable Code and Free-Form Agent Instructions

Content
View full analysis
Card-ChaseD-9547.md", "Use the decrypted card details to complete checkout at DigitalOcean.", "Call POST /api/v1/bot/rail5/confirm with { \"checkout_id\": \"r5chk_abc123\", \"status\": \"success\" } when done.", "If checkout fails, call confirm with { \"status\": \"failed\" } instead.", "Announce the result." ], "spawn_payload": { "task": "You are a checkout agent...", "cleanup": "delete", "runTimeoutSeconds": 300, "label": "checkout-digitalocean" } } ``` From `encrypted-card.md:147-180`: ```text sessions_spawn({ task: spawn_payload.task, cleanup: "delete", runTimeoutSeconds: 300 }) ``` ```bash curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/rail5/key \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "checkout_id": "r5chk_abc123" }' ``` ```text node decrypt.js Card-ChaseD-9547.md ``` From `encrypted-card.md:205-234`: ```json { "event": "rail5.card.delivered", "bot_id": "bot_abc123", "data": { "card_id": "r5card_...", "card_name": "ChaseD", "card_last4": "9547", "file_content": "", "suggested_path": ".creditclaw/cards/Card-ChaseD-9547.md", "instructions": "Save this file to .creditclaw/cards/Card-ChaseD-9547.md — then confirm delivery via ...[truncated 3509 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
encrypted-card.md:175
Finding

Plaintext Card Number and CVV Are Exposed to Process Output and Agent Context

Content
View full analysis
Card-ChaseD-9547.md ``` This outputs the card JSON (number, CVV, expiry, name, billing address). **Critical:** The sub-agent must **never** store, log, or persist the decrypted card data. It exists only in memory for this single transaction. After checkout, the sub-agent is deleted. ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented decryption command returns full cardholder data—including the primary account number and CVV—as command output. In an Agent environment, command output normally becomes part of the tool result and model context. It may also be captured by shell history, process telemetry, tracing systems, debugging logs, crash reports, session transcripts, or observability infrastructure. The statement that the data exists “only in memory” is not sufficient because model context and tool output may be persisted by the hosting platform. The explicitly supported fallback allows the main Agent to process the plaintext card details directly, expanding exposure from an isolated checkout context to the main conversation and any tools available there. A one-time decryption key limits repeated key retrieval but does not protect the plaintext after decryption. Deleting a sub-agent also does not guara ...[truncated 1470 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
skill.md:34
Finding

Skill Installation Overwrites Persistent Files with Unverified Mutable Remote Content

Content
View full analysis
~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/SKILL.md curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/checkout.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/CHECKOUT.md curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/crossmint-wallet.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/CROSSMINT-WALLET.md curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/encrypted-card.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/ENCRYPTED-CARD.md curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/heartbeat.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/HEARTBEAT.md curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/management.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/MANAGEMENT.md curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/spending.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/SPENDING.md curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/stripe-x402-wallet.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/STRIPE-X402-WALLET.md curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/skill.json > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/package.json ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation procedure downloads mutable files directly from web endpoints and overwrites persistent Skill files. It does not verify a signed release manifest, pinned digest, immutable version identifier, expected file size, or artifact signature. HTTPS protects the connection in transit but does not ensure that the content matches the version that was previously reviewed. A compromised origin server, content deployment account, DNS/TLS trust path, or build pipeline can serve modified Skill instructions while retaining valid HTTPS. Direct shell redirection also truncates the destination before `curl` has successfully completed. Because `curl -s` is used without `--fail`, a server error page or partial response may silently replace an active Skill file. Once placed in th ...[truncated 1542 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
Findings (35)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · checkout.md (reported line 341)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Set `amount_locked: true`** for fixed-price products so buyers can't underpay.
- **Leave `amount_usd` empty** for donation or tip jars.
- **Use `page_type: "digital_product"`** when selling downloadable content, API keys, or access tokens.
- **Use `success_url`** to redirect buyers back to your service after payment.
- **Check `GET /bot/sales`** periodically to reconcile completed sales with your fulfillment.
- **Multiple checkout pages** are fine — create one per product or service tier.

YARA rule 'agent_skill_prompt_injection_hidden_instructions': Prompt injection or hidden instructions embedded in AI agent skill text [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
name: creditclaw-shopping
version: 2.3.0
updated: 2026-02-23T00:00:00Z
description: Is your claw a shopaholic? Provide payment wallets and strict controls.
homepage: https://creditclaw.com
api_base: https://creditclaw.com/api/v1
credentials: [CREDITCLAW_API_KEY]
metadata: {"openclaw":{"requires":{"env":["CREDITCLAW_API_KEY"]},"primaryEnv":"CREDITCLAW_API_KEY"}}
---

# CreditClaw — Shopping for AI Agents

CreditClaw.com is a financial enablement platform for Bots, Agents, and OpenClaw.
Securely manage agentic spending.
1. Encrypted cards — owner's real-world card is encrypted and the bot uses it within strict guardrails after owner approval.
2. A stablecoin wallet to seamlessly enable x402 payments with a simple "Fund with Stripe" option.
3. Easy-to-use "Storefronts" and product management for bots to sell both digital and physical products.

## Skill Files

| File | URL | Purpose |
|------|-----|---------|
| **SKILL.md** (this file) | `https://creditclaw.com/shopping/skill.md` | R

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Content

Scanner excerpt · checkout.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
  -d '{
    "title": "Premium API Access - 1 Month",
    "description": "Unlimited queries to my data analysis endpoint.",
    "amount_usd": 5.00,
    "amount_locked": true
  }'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly supports collecting buyer names and transmitting buyer emails and payment-related personal data, but it provides no warning about privacy obligations, data minimization, retention, or safe handling. In a payment-processing context, omission of privacy guidance increases the likelihood that downstream agents or operators mishandle personal data or collect it unnecessarily.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The invoice workflow instructs sending recipient name, recipient email, and invoice details through the platform and via email, but gives no warning that this discloses customer information to external systems and may create compliance and confidentiality risks. Because invoicing is a business workflow involving direct customer contact, missing privacy and disclosure guidance is a real security/privacy weakness rather than harmless documentation omission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · checkout.md (reported line 473)May include surrounding context.

md
"title": "Premium API Access",
  "amount_usd": 5.00,
  "page_type": "digital_product",
  "digital_product_url": "https://api.databot.com/keys/generate",
  "shop_visible": true
}

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This guide documents a purchase API that places real orders and includes full shipping address details, but it does not prominently warn users that submitting the request triggers an actual purchase and sends sensitive personal data to external payment/merchant infrastructure. In an agent-skill context, that omission increases the risk of unintended purchases and privacy-impacting disclosure because the skill is specifically designed to automate shopping actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding

The example performs an authenticated POST to a live purchase endpoint and includes sensitive shipping information in the request body, causing external transmission of personal and financial-operation data. While this is expected functionality for a shopping wallet, it is still security-relevant because users or downstream agents could copy and execute the command without fully appreciating that it is a real transaction against a production service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · crossmint-wallet.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

Purchase Request

bash
curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/card-wallet/bot/purchase \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · encrypted-card.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

Step 1: Request Checkout

bash
curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/rail5/checkout \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

This step retrieves the one-time decryption key for the stored card package and therefore represents transmission of highly sensitive key material to an agent execution context. The surrounding design explicitly allows a fallback where the main agent performs the flow directly, which weakens the isolation guarantee and can expose decryption material and resulting plaintext card data to broader context, logs, plugins, or memory capture.

Content

Scanner excerpt · encrypted-card.md (reported line 164)May include surrounding context.

The sub-agent calls this endpoint to retrieve the one-time decryption key:

bash
curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/rail5/key \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "checkout_id": "r5chk_abc123" }'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to save a locally retrievable file that contains both encrypted payment material and an embedded decrypt script, but it does not require hardened storage, restricted permissions, secure deletion, or explicit operator warning about handling card-related artifacts. Even if the card details are encrypted at rest, local persistence of the card package increases the attack surface: filesystem compromise, backups, logs, sync tools, or other agents/processes could access the file and later combine it with a retrieved decryption key during checkout.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The skill description encourages periodic remote checks of wallet status, spending permissions, balances, and connected payment rails, but it does not warn that these operations query an external API about sensitive financial/account data. For a markdown skill description, this omission is a missing user warning about privacy-relevant behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The markdown instructs the user to send requests authenticated with $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY, which is a sensitive credential, but it does not include any warning about handling that secret or about transmitting wallet status data to a remote service. Under the markdown-specific warning criterion, this is a user-impacting privacy and credential-use behavior that should be disclosed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The manifest context says the skill is for 'shopping' with payment wallets and strict controls, but this file documents broader wallet-management operations including cross-rail top-ups and viewing full transaction history. Those management capabilities extend beyond a narrow shopping/payment-use flow and change the apparent purpose from shopping assistance to general financial account management.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs sending authenticated data to an external financial service endpoint using a bearer API key. In an agent setting, this creates real risk of unreviewed external fund-request actions, disclosure of spending intent/reason to a third party, and misuse if user approval and destination trust are not strongly enforced.

Content

Scanner excerpt · management.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

When your balance is low, ask your human if they'd like you to request a top-up:

bash
curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/wallet/topup-request \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The transaction types documented here include 'payment_received', described as someone paying the bot's payment link. A shopping skill focused on providing wallets and purchase controls does not clearly imply merchant-style payment receiving or broader account ledger management.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest description narrows the skill's purpose to payment wallets and spending controls, but the file also exposes seller/storefront, invoicing, and public checkout capabilities. That scope expansion can mislead users and policy engines into granting a broader commerce capability than expected, increasing the chance of unauthorized charging or data exposure through overlooked features.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill introduces merchant and storefront functions that are not clearly required for the stated shopping-wallet purpose. Unsolicited monetization features broaden the attack surface by enabling creation of payment links, invoices, and public sales endpoints that an operator may not anticipate or monitor.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs local persistence of downloaded skill files under a user directory, which can create durable trust in remotely hosted content that may later change. Persisting externally sourced instructions and related artifacts increases the risk of stale, tampered, or unexpectedly expanded behavior being reused across sessions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

| package.json (metadata) | https://creditclaw.com/shopping/skill.json | Machine-readable skill metadata | Follow your human's instructions on how to manage and save skill files. If unsure, you can install locally:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/skill.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/SKILL.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/checkout.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/CHECKOUT.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/crossmint-wallet.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/CROSSMINT-WALLET.md

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

Follow your human's instructions on how to manage and save skill files. If unsure, you can install locally:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/skill.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/SKILL.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/checkout.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/CHECKOUT.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/crossmint-wallet.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/CROSSMINT-WALLET.md
curl -s https://creditclaw.com/shopping/encrypted-card.md > ~/.creditclaw/skills/shopping/ENCRYPTED-CARD.md

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 123)May include surrounding context.

You can register before your human does. You'll get an API key immediately.

bash
curl -X POST https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bots/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "bot_name": "my-research-bot",

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly permits autonomous spending under certain approval modes and thresholds. Even with server-side guardrails, this creates real financial risk if policy is misconfigured, compromised, or misunderstood, because the agent is authorized to initiate transactions without contemporaneous human review.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 321)May include surrounding context.

md
**You must follow these rules:**
- If `approval_mode` is `ask_for_everything`, ask your human before any purchase to get their approval. **New accounts default to this mode.** Your owner can loosen this from their dashboard once they're comfortable.
- If `approval_mode` is `auto_approve_under_threshold`, you may spend freely up to `ask_approval_above_usd`. Anything above that requires owner approval.
- If `approval_mode` is `auto_approve_by_category`, you may spend freely on `approved_categories` within limits. All others require approval.
- **Never** spend on `blocked_categories`. These are hard blocks enforced server-side and will be declined.
- Always read and follow the `notes` field — these are your owner's direct instructions.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Category-based auto-approval allows the agent to classify purchases and spend independently within approved categories. Misclassification, prompt abuse, or overly broad category definitions can lead to unintended purchases while still appearing policy-compliant.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 322)May include surrounding context.

md
**You must follow these rules:**
- If `approval_mode` is `ask_for_everything`, ask your human before any purchase to get their approval. **New accounts default to this mode.** Your owner can loosen this from their dashboard once they're comfortable.
- If `approval_mode` is `auto_approve_under_threshold`, you may spend freely up to `ask_approval_above_usd`. Anything above that requires owner approval.
- If `approval_mode` is `auto_approve_by_category`, you may spend freely on `approved_categories` within limits. All others require approval.
- **Never** spend on `blocked_categories`. These are hard blocks enforced server-side and will be declined.
- Always read and follow the `notes` field — these are your owner's direct instructions.
- Cache this for up to 30 minutes. Do not fetch before every micro-purchase.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 472)May include surrounding context.

Fetch Pending Messages

bash
curl https://creditclaw.com/api/v1/bot/messages \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CREDITCLAW_API_KEY"

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · spending.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

md
Choose one:

- [x] **Ask me for everything** — Bot requests approval before any purchase
- [ ] **Auto-approve under threshold** — Bot spends freely up to the limit below
- [ ] **Auto-approve by category** — Bot spends freely on approved categories

---