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Book a flight or Airbnb | Is your claw a nomad?

v1.0.0

Easy-to-use agentic wallets powered by Stripe. Use your existing Stripe/Link to top-up this versatile x402 wallet for any purchases or A2A payments.

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MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
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medium confidence
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Purpose & Capability
The registry listing title ('Book a flight or Airbnb | Is your claw a nomad?') and slug ('book') imply a booking/commerce skill, but every included file and the SKILL.md implement a payments/wallet platform (CreditClaw/Stripe/x402/Encrypted Card). That mismatch is confusing and could be a metadata error, but it reduces trust and should be clarified with the publisher.
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Instruction Scope
The runtime docs instruct agents to download and save multiple files into ~/.creditclaw/skills/stripe and .creditclaw/cards, spawn ephemeral sub-agents, fetch one-time decryption keys, and run a provided decrypt.js to decrypt real card data. While these actions are coherent for an encrypted-card payment rail, they entail writing files to disk and executing code delivered alongside encrypted card files. The SKILL.md explicitly allows running checkout_steps in the main agent if sub-agent spawning is unavailable — this fallback would expose decrypted card data to the main agent and broadens the risk surface.
Install Mechanism
There is no formal install spec (instruction-only), but SKILL.md includes curl commands that fetch files from https://creditclaw.com into the user's home directory. The downloads are from the service's declared domain (creditclaw.com), which is expected for this integration, but any curl+write pattern can introduce risk if the remote content is malicious or becomes compromised. No third-party or shortened URLs are used.
Credentials
Only a single credential (CREDITCLAW_API_KEY) is requested and declared as the primaryEnv. That is appropriate for a service that exposes an API and enforces Authorization: Bearer <api-key> on endpoints.
Persistence & Privilege
always is false and the skill does not request system-wide privileges. However, the instructions ask the agent to persist files under ~/.creditclaw and to store delivered encrypted card files under .creditclaw/cards; this is expected for the claimed functionality but gives the skill persistent local artifacts that should be managed carefully (file permissions, cleanup, audit).
What to consider before installing
This skill appears to implement a payment/wallet integration (CreditClaw) and legitimately requires a CreditClaw API key — but there are several things to check before installing: - Clarify the metadata/title mismatch with the publisher; unexpected names can be a sign of mispackaging. - Only provide an API key you trust the service with; consider using a scoped or rotated key if possible and monitoring its use. - The docs instruct the agent to download files and to execute a decrypt script delivered with encrypted card files. Ensure your agent environment supports spawning true isolated sub-agents (so decrypted card data never touches the main agent). If sub-agent isolation is not available, avoid running the decrypt flow in the main agent. - Review any decrypt.js or other scripts delivered by creditclaw.com before executing them; executing code fetched from the network can be dangerous even when hosted on an expected domain. - If you install files under ~/.creditclaw, verify file permissions and consider isolating or sandboxing that directory. Remove or revoke local artifacts if you stop trusting the skill. - If you need higher assurance, ask the publisher for: a) explanation for the title/slug mismatch, b) a verifiable code release (e.g., GitHub release or package) for the decrypt script, and c) details about sub-agent isolation guarantees. Given these issues, proceed only if you trust creditclaw.com and can enforce the recommended isolation and monitoring practices.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

Runtime requirements

EnvCREDITCLAW_API_KEY
Primary envCREDITCLAW_API_KEY

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