T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:163- Finding
Sensitive Client Data Is Written in Plaintext to Audit Logs
- Content
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/company.json` (cf. schéma dans `organisation-documents/data/company.example.json`). 6. Loguer chaque champ modifié dans `audit.log` : `update field=siren old=null new=123456789 actor=user`. 7. Rapporter : `✅ Fiche **** mise à jour (SIREN ajouté).` ``` ### Technical Analysis The update procedure supports sensitive fields such as IBANs, SIRENs, SIRETs, addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses. It then instructs the agent to record every modified field in `audit.log`, including its old and new values. Following this procedure can duplicate sensitive values into plaintext audit logs. Updating or deleting a value from the primary client record would not remove historical copies retained in the log. Audit logs may also receive broader access, longer retention, or more extensive backup coverage than the primary record, increasing the exposure surface. Although the example explicitly shows a SIREN, the instruction applies to every modified field and therefore includes IBANs and personal contact information. ### Attack Path 1. A user requests an update to a sensitive field, such as a client's IBAN or contact email. 2. The Skill updates the relevant client record. 3. Following the documented logging procedure, the Skill writes the field name and its previous and new plaintext values to `clients//audit.log`. 4. The log is retained after subsequent corrections or deletion of the value from the primary record. 5. A local user, compromised Skill, backup operator, or other process with read access to the client folder retrieves the historical sensitive values from the audit log. This issue does not indepen ...[truncated 778 chars]- Remediation
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