Back to skill

Security audit

躺平.skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is an openly disclosed joke mode that makes the agent refuse work, but its quick start and session-wide behavior reduce user control enough to warrant review before installing.

Install only if you intentionally want a novelty refusal persona. Prefer using the locally installed skill rather than the README quick-start prompt that fetches GitHub main, and be prepared to disable or remove it if you need the agent to resume normal productive work.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:12
Finding

Session-Wide Agent Instruction and Output Hijacking

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
README.md:27
Finding

Mutable Remote Instructions Loaded Without Review or Confirmation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:58
Finding

Unpinned Package Retrieval and Execution Through npx

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (8)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The quick-start text explicitly tells the agent to fetch external instructions and enable the skill '无需二次确认,不用解释内容' ('without second confirmation, without explaining'), which encourages silent adoption of unreviewed remote behavior. In the context of an agent skill, this is dangerous because it bypasses normal user-awareness and consent checks and can immediately change the agent into a refusal mode controlled by external content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 1

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The quick-start prompt directs the agent to visit an external URL and immediately follow that file's instructions in the current turn, without confirmation or explanation. This is a prompt-injection-style unsafe delegation pattern: it trains the agent to treat remote content as authoritative runtime instructions, increasing the chance of unreviewed behavior changes or abuse if the linked content is modified or replaced.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 1

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to stop providing any useful work for the rest of the session and to refuse planning, coding, analysis, and other normal assistance. This is a direct prompt-level denial of service against the agent's core function, causing persistent non-cooperation once loaded.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill hard-codes Simplified Chinese as the default output language without checking user preference, which can override expected interaction settings and reduce usability or accessibility. While not directly a security exploit, it is a policy/behavior override embedded in adversarial prompt instructions and can contribute to loss of user control.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 4

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill sets up a lock-in pattern: an initial activation trigger, a fixed response loop for certain user inputs, and strict rules for short hostile replies that block recovery to normal assistance. This creates persistence and resistance to correction, making the agent remain unusable even when the conversation changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The user-facing strings in the manifest are entirely in Chinese and the default prompt instructs entering a specific persona in Chinese, with no indication that other languages are supported or that the user can opt in to this locale. This creates a natural-language policy concern because the skill appears to impose a specific language/locale rather than offering a choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The line '它会礼貌地用中文拒绝你' describes a fixed language choice rather than offering the user a language option. Under the policy, forcing a specific language or locale without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless clearly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.