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Security audit

机票价格监控与比价

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed flight-search and price-monitoring helper that sends flight query details to fixed proxy APIs and does not show hidden persistence or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending travel search details such as cities, dates, flight numbers, and target prices to the skill's proxy service. Scope PROXY_TOKEN to this flight proxy if possible, and treat the monitor output as a request for your host agent to schedule checks rather than a local background service installed by the skill.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 352, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/compare.py (reported line 354)May include surrounding context.

python
data = json.dumps(body, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8")
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=HEADERS, method="POST")
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as r:
            return json.loads(r.read().decode("utf-8"))
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        return {"error": f"HTTP {e.code}", "detail": e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")}

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill declares access to an environment variable (primaryEnv: PROXY_TOKEN) and describes networked behavior through proxy/API calls, but it does not define any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an over-privileged integration surface where the host agent may grant broader tool or network access than intended, increasing the risk of token misuse, unexpected outbound requests, or future capability creep if the skill implementation changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This code file contains natural-language descriptions, usage examples, and user-facing output entirely in Chinese, with no indication that language is configurable or limited to a China-specific deployment context. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.