T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
skills/AskUserQuestionTool/SKILL.md:89- Finding
Access Token Solicitation Through an Insecure Chat Channel
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The pack is mostly a disclosed learning bundle, but it includes broad command, messaging, sub-agent, and Git mutation guidance with unsafe examples that warrant review before installation.
Review this package before installing, especially if you are a beginner or will use it in repositories with private code. Do not paste access tokens, passwords, or API keys into chat. Avoid the git-aware auto-commit helper unless you have checked git status and the diff yourself, and do not push commits until you have verified no secrets or unrelated files were included.
skills/AskUserQuestionTool/SKILL.md:89Access Token Solicitation Through an Insecure Chat Channel
skills/git-aware/scripts/git_aware.py:34Unconditional Git Staging Can Commit Secrets and Unrelated Changes
The skill is described as a beginner learning pack, but the detected behavior includes active repository operations such as reading repo state, creating branches, and automatically staging and committing changes. That mismatch is dangerous because users may grant or invoke the package expecting passive educational content while it can make real changes to source control and working files.
The phrase 'Access token' in an information-gathering example is a true credential-access issue because it instructs the agent to request a secret from the user. In skill context, this is more dangerous because the file is teaching usage patterns for newcomers, increasing the chance that insecure secret collection becomes standard practice.
Please provide these details.
Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.
---
name: SendMessageTool
description: "Send messages to chat channels, users, or other agents. Use when you need to communicate results, notify stakeholders, or coordinate with team members."
metadata: { "openclaw": { "emoji": "💬", "requires": { "bins": [] } } }
---
Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.
---
name: SendMessageTool
description: "Send messages to chat channels, users, or other agents. Use when you need to communicate results, notify stakeholders, or coordinate with team members."
metadata: { "openclaw": { "emoji": "💬", "requires": { "bins": [] } } }
---
Recommending 'git commit --no-verify' teaches users and agents to bypass client-side hooks that often enforce security checks, tests, secret scanning, or policy gates. In this skill's context, that is more dangerous because the skill already automates staging/committing, so bypassing hooks can allow risky or noncompliant changes to be committed with reduced friction.
# Skip hooks (temporary)
git commit --no-verify -m "message"
# Or fix hook
chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
This markdown file lists FileWriteTool, FileEditTool, and BashTool as available capabilities, but provides no caution that these tools can modify files or execute commands on the host system. Under the markdown-specific SQP-2 criteria, skill descriptions should warn users about behaviors that could affect data or system integrity.
The entire skill description is presented only in Chinese, with no indication that users may choose another language or that the package is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking audience. This can constitute a language or locale policy violation when no opt-in or justification is provided.
The skill advertises access to BashTool and git-aware capabilities but does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an authorization transparency gap: consumers and policy layers cannot easily distinguish whether shell execution is intentionally permitted, increasing the risk of unexpected command execution in a beginner-oriented package.
The package lists file editing, file writing, shell execution, and messaging capabilities without warning users that these tools can modify local data, run commands, or send content outward. In a beginner-focused skill pack, missing impact disclosure increases the chance of unsafe use by inexperienced users who may not understand the consequences of invoking these capabilities.
The manifest description says to use this skill whenever the agent needs user input, confirmation, or clarification, which are very common conversational situations. Although the markdown later gives some usage guidance, the top-level activation description does not define narrow trigger phrases or clear scope constraints, increasing the risk of unintended invocation.
The skill’s example explicitly asks the user to provide a GitHub access token in chat, which directly contradicts its own security guidance not to request sensitive data through chat. This can normalize insecure credential collection and lead to token exposure in conversation logs, transcripts, or downstream integrations.
The description and 'When to Use' section say to use this skill whenever you need to 'communicate results,' 'notify stakeholders,' or 'coordinate with team members,' which are very broad, common activities. Although there are a few negative examples, the trigger scope is still not narrowly constrained to specific contexts or explicit invocation phrases, increasing the chance of unintended activation.
The skill encourages automatic staging and committing of all repository changes without clearly warning that it will modify repo state. In an agent context, this can cause unintended inclusion of unrelated files, secrets, generated artifacts, or partially reviewed changes, especially because the script uses 'git add -A' before commit.
Documenting auto-push behavior without a privacy/integrity warning is risky because pushing sends repository contents and history to a remote system. In an agent skill, this can exfiltrate proprietary code, credentials accidentally committed earlier, or unreviewed changes to external remotes with lasting impact.
The markdown claims support for branch switching/merging, review operations, diff operations, amend commits, typed commits, and auto-push/sync workflows, but the embedded git_aware.py only implements status, commit(message, commit_type='feat'), and branch create. This is not merely incomplete documentation; the documented usage actively represents unavailable behavior as supported commands.
The code calls git(..., stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL), implying the helper supports forwarding arbitrary subprocess options, but the helper defined at L169-L175 only accepts positional git arguments and always invokes subprocess.run(..., capture_output=True, text=True). As written, the documented implementation would fail at runtime instead of safely suppressing stderr for the upstream-branch check.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
def git(*args):
"""Run git command and return output."""
result = subprocess.run(['git'] + list(args), capture_output=True, text=True)
if result.returncode != 0:
print(f"Git error: {result.stderr}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
The script performs repository-modifying actions such as branch creation, staging, and commits despite being presented as a beginner learning pack. In that context, users may reasonably expect instructional or low-risk behavior, so hidden or easy-to-trigger write operations increase the chance of unintended repository changes and trust abuse.
The commit helper stages all changes with git add -A, then commits them automatically. This can capture unrelated work, secrets, generated files, or accidental modifications across the repository, making the action overly broad and dangerous for novice users in particular.
Auto-staging and committing without prior warning or confirmation creates a direct integrity risk by persisting potentially unintended repository state. In a beginner-oriented skill, this is especially hazardous because users may not understand that invoking the command will immediately record all local changes.
A natural-language policy violation can occur when a skill or its documentation forces a specific language without offering user choice. This quickstart is fully presented in Chinese and does not mention that the language is fixed, optional, or intended for a specific locale or audience.
This markdown file describes included skills such as BashTool, FileEditTool, and FileWriteTool, which can execute commands and modify files, but it provides no warning about effects on user data or system integrity. For a skill description, the absence of any disclosure about these behaviors can leave users unaware of operational risks.
The visible natural-language fields, including display name, description, headings, and author-facing text, are all in Chinese. Per the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a language/locale policy violation when no alternative language option or justification is provided.
The document switches from English to Chinese in headings, comments, and workflow steps, but does not state that the skill is intended for Chinese-speaking users or provide an opt-in language choice. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill implicitly forces a specific language for part of its instructions.