T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:28- Finding
Execution of an Unpinned Third-Party npm Package
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:28-39
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash # If not already installed npm install -g @remotego/remotego # Start mirroring Claude Code remotego claudebash npx @remotego/remotego claudeTechnical Analysis
The skill directs users to install or execute
@remotego/remotegowithout specifying an exact version or verifying its integrity and provenance. Both commands resolve a mutable package release from the npm registry. Thenpxcommand can download and immediately execute package code, while global installation makes the package persist in the user's global Node.js environment.The audited project contains no copy of the dependency's source code, package lockfile, integrity hash, or signature. Consequently, the effective code executed by these instructions can differ from the artifact that was reviewed. This does not prove that the current package is malicious, but it creates a supply-chain exposure if a future release, package maintainer account, or registry distribution path is compromised.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the npm package, a maintainer account, or its publication process.
- The attacker publishes a malicious release under the same package name.
- A user follows the skill and runs the unversioned
npm install -gornpxcommand. - npm retrieves the mutable malicious release.
- Package installation hooks or runtime code execute with the invoking user's permissions.
- The payload can access resources available to that user, potentially including project files, environment variables, credentials, and terminal state.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running the command. The accessible scope may include the current project, user-owned files, e ...[truncated 224 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to an exact, previously audited version rather than resolving the latest release.
- Verify npm provenance, publisher identity, and package integrity before execution.
- Record and validate an expected integrity hash in a reproducible installation process.
- Avoid global installation; use a dedicated, least-privileged, isolated environment.
- Disable or carefully control package lifecycle scripts where feasible.
- Review the package source and transitive dependencies for the pinned release.
- Document a controlled upgrade process requiring renewed security review before changing versions.
