T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:58- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation and Execution
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 58-68
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unverifiable third-party dependency execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
markdown ### Install First (if not installed) ```bash npm install -g @remotego/remotegoOr use without installing:
bash npx @remotego/remotego bashtext ### Technical Analysis The instructions install or execute `@remotego/remotego` without specifying an exact version, integrity hash, lockfile, or other provenance verification. Both commands resolve package contents from an external package registry at execution time, allowing the effective code to differ from what was previously reviewed. The global installation method also persists a package-controlled executable in the user's global npm environment. The `npx` alternative avoids an explicit global installation but still downloads and runs externally supplied package code. This creates a supply-chain exposure: compromise of the package publisher account, registry, package release process, or a future package version could result in arbitrary code execution on systems following these instructions. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, release pipeline, or another relevant distribution component. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version under the same npm package name. 3. A user follows the documented `npm install -g` or `npx` instruction without an exact version or integrity validation. 4. npm retrieves the attacker-controlled release. 5. Package lifecycle scripts or the invoked executable run with the privileges of the user executing the command. 6. The malicious package can access data and perform actions available to that user. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation can provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the invoking user. This may expose user-readable files, environment var ...[truncated 355 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to a specific, audited version rather than resolving the latest release.
- Publish and verify cryptographic integrity information for the approved package artifact.
- Provide verifiable source and build provenance for distributed releases.
- Prefer a project-local, locked dependency over global installation.
- Use a lockfile with integrity metadata and a trusted internal registry or package allowlist where appropriate.
- Audit package lifecycle scripts and transitive dependencies before installation.
- Run the package under a dedicated, least-privileged account or sandbox with restricted filesystem, credential, and network access.
- Establish a documented dependency review and update process so version changes require renewed security assessment.
