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Security audit

music-podcast-research

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its music and podcast research purpose, but its helper script also exposes a broad, user-directed Crawlora API proxy beyond that purpose.

Install only if you are comfortable with the agent sending music, podcast, profile, URL, and other lookup inputs to Crawlora using your API key. Treat the shell helper as a broad Crawlora API client, not just a music/podcast tool; prefer calling only the documented Spotify, Spotify Podcasts, Apple Podcasts, and Discogs endpoints.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The helper explicitly documents use of unrelated endpoints such as Amazon, YouTube, Google Search, and Google Trends, which exceeds the skill’s declared music/podcast research purpose. This capability expansion can enable unreviewed web research and data access through a trusted skill interface, increasing the chance of policy bypass or misuse.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The script accepts an arbitrary API path and method and forwards them directly to the third-party Crawlora API, effectively exposing a generic proxy rather than a scoped music/podcast helper. In the context of an agent skill, this broad capability can be repurposed for unrelated external research or data retrieval beyond what users and reviewers would expect.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The file explicitly instructs that user-supplied search terms, IDs, usernames, URLs, and other identifiers are sent to an external service using an API key, but it provides no user-facing warning or privacy guidance. This can lead to unintentional disclosure of personal data or sensitive listening/research queries to a third-party processor, especially for profile, follower, and search endpoints.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Endpoints this skill uses, grouped by platform. Call them via `scripts/crawlora.sh` (see SKILL.md).

All paths are relative to the API base `https://api.crawlora.net/api/v1` and require the header `x-api-key: $CRAWLORA_API_KEY`. Path params like `{id}` are substituted into the URL; `GET` params go in the query string; `POST` params go in a JSON body.

**53 endpoints across 4 platform group(s).**
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
https://api.crawlora.net/

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
curl -fsS -G "${auth[@]}" "${qs[@]}" "${base}${path}"
else
  [ -n "$body" ] || body="${rest[0]:-{}}"
  curl -fsS -X "$method" "${auth[@]}" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$body" "${base}${path}"
fi
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
curl -fsS -X "$method" "${auth[@]}" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:23