Back to skill

Security audit

dingtalk-openclaw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill matches its stated DingTalk AI bot purpose, but it handles enterprise chat content and credentials with weak scoping, plaintext configuration, and potentially sensitive logging.

Review before installing in a real organization. Use a dedicated low-privilege DingTalk app, store secrets outside source code, pin dependencies, restrict which chats or users can invoke the bot, avoid sending sensitive messages unless approved, and disable or redact message-body logging.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:27
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
--hash=sha256: requests== --hash=sha256: ``` ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:72
Finding

Sensitive Credentials Are Stored in Plaintext Python Configuration

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:153
Finding

Conversation Content and API Error Bodies Are Logged Without Redaction

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill description does not clearly warn users or deployers that incoming DingTalk messages are forwarded to an external AI HTTP API and that generated replies are sent back automatically. This creates a real transparency and privacy risk because sensitive business chat content may be transmitted off-platform without informed consent or adequate review, which is especially significant in an enterprise messaging context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This code forwards user-supplied DingTalk message content directly to the OpenClaw HTTP API via requests.post. In this skill's context, that is the intended feature, but it is still a real data exposure boundary: chat content may include sensitive internal information, and the skill provides no filtering, consent prompt, classification check, or minimization before external transmission.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 107)May include surrounding context.

md
"model": "openclaw",
            "input": user_msg
        }
        r = requests.post(OPENCLAW_URL, headers=headers, json=data, timeout=60)
        if r.status_code == 200:
            result = r.json()
            output = result.get("output", [])

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 129)May include surrounding context.

md
"at": {"atUserIds": [], "isAtAll": False}
    }
    try:
        r = requests.post(WEBHOOK_URL, json=data, timeout=10)
        result = r.json()
        logging.info(f"回复结果: {result}")
        return result.get("errcode", 1) == 0