T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:27- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill matches its stated DingTalk AI bot purpose, but it handles enterprise chat content and credentials with weak scoping, plaintext configuration, and potentially sensitive logging.
Review before installing in a real organization. Use a dedicated low-privilege DingTalk app, store secrets outside source code, pin dependencies, restrict which chats or users can invoke the bot, avoid sending sensitive messages unless approved, and disable or redact message-body logging.
SKILL.md:27Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Risk
SKILL.md:72Sensitive Credentials Are Stored in Plaintext Python Configuration
SKILL.md:153Conversation Content and API Error Bodies Are Logged Without Redaction
The skill description does not clearly warn users or deployers that incoming DingTalk messages are forwarded to an external AI HTTP API and that generated replies are sent back automatically. This creates a real transparency and privacy risk because sensitive business chat content may be transmitted off-platform without informed consent or adequate review, which is especially significant in an enterprise messaging context.
This code forwards user-supplied DingTalk message content directly to the OpenClaw HTTP API via requests.post. In this skill's context, that is the intended feature, but it is still a real data exposure boundary: chat content may include sensitive internal information, and the skill provides no filtering, consent prompt, classification check, or minimization before external transmission.
"model": "openclaw",
"input": user_msg
}
r = requests.post(OPENCLAW_URL, headers=headers, json=data, timeout=60)
if r.status_code == 200:
result = r.json()
output = result.get("output", [])
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"at": {"atUserIds": [], "isAtAll": False}
}
try:
r = requests.post(WEBHOOK_URL, json=data, timeout=10)
result = r.json()
logging.info(f"回复结果: {result}")
return result.get("errcode", 1) == 0