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Security audit

Skill Orchestra

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed routing helper with some overclaimed or unfinished features, but the inspected artifacts do not show hidden data access, persistence, exfiltration, or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable with a routing helper that may keep or learn from routing decisions if its documented v2 examples are completed later. The current bundled runtime looks low-risk, but its wrapper and documentation are incomplete, so expect possible functional issues rather than security impact.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (7)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The declared description promises a specific routing system with explicit competence/cost modeling and performance characteristics. The supplied code does not implement those behaviors; instead, it is a generic adapter/wrapper around an external 'skill_orchestra.py' implementation. Its only visible routing-related logic is simple keyword matching in can_handle(). It also dynamically imports and executes another class, which is a broader and more generic capability than the declared purpose. Because the primary visible behavior is wrapper/delegation rather than the claimed modeled router, the description does not accurately represent what this code chunk itself actually does.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The regex patterns are extremely broad and match common verbs like 'analyze', 'write', 'create', 'find', and 'solve', which can cause the router to activate on a large share of ordinary prompts. Overbroad trigger scope can route unrelated or sensitive user requests through this skill unexpectedly, increasing the chance of unnecessary context capture, unintended agent selection, or downstream processing not expected by the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a routing skill focused on competence/cost-based agent selection. The v2.0.0 documentation introduces a pattern learner that loads routing history from a file ("memory/routing-patterns.json"), expanding the skill into persistent learning/behavior-tracking rather than just performing routing decisions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The manifest claims skill-aware agent routing for current requests, but the predictive router goes further by anticipating likely next contexts and pre-routing them in advance. That proactive speculative behavior is not clearly conveyed by the manifest's limited routing description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes explicit competence/cost modeling for agent routing, but this wrapper only registers a generic capability and uses simple substring checks in can_handle before blindly dispatching to whichever method exists on a dynamically loaded class. That behavior does not implement the described routing model and materially understates the gap between the claimed orchestration logic and the actual code in this file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · unified_wrapper.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
# Find the main class
            for name in dir(module):
                obj = getattr(module, name)
                if isinstance(obj, type) and name != "UnifiedSkill":
                    self._original = obj()
                    break

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The method is documented as registering the skill's capabilities, yet the inline TODO and single "general" registration show it is not actually describing the skill's real routing/orchestration competence. This is a direct intent/documentation mismatch rather than mere omission because the code presents a placeholder as if it were the implemented capability set.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.