Back to skill

Security audit

Generate Legal Services Ad Creative Brief

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears to be a simple legal advertising brief generator, but it requests shell and file-read access that its own workflow does not explain or need.

Review this before installing because the skill asks for more local authority than its advertised drafting task needs. It should be safest in a sandboxed OpenClaw environment, and users should avoid granting shell or broad file-read access unless they specifically need it and understand why.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:11
Finding
Overly Broad Shell and File-Read Permissions<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:11` **Vulnerability Type**: Excessive tool permissions **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```yaml allowed-tools: Bash, Read ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill grants access to both shell execution (`Bash`) and local-file reading (`Read`). Its documented purpose is to generate advertising creative briefs for legal services, and the declared workflow does not identify any legitimate need to execute system commands or inspect arbitrary local files. This violates the principle of least privilege. Although the reviewed skill contains no instruction that directly abuses these tools, making them available unnecessarily increases the impact of malicious user input, prompt injection, or untrusted content introduced during a skill session. ### Attack Path 1. A user activates the skill to generate a legal-services advertising brief. 2. Malicious or injected content instructs the agent to inspect local files or execute a shell command as part of the requested workflow. 3. Because `Read` and `Bash` are explicitly allowed, the agent may treat those operations as authorized. 4. The attacker could cause unauthorized file disclosure or command execution within the permissions of the agent process. No automatic exploitation path or malicious shell command was found in the reviewed files; exploitation depends on untrusted instructions reaching an agent that honors the broad tool declaration. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could allow reading files accessible to the agent process and executing commands under that process's operating-system account. The exact scope depends on the host sandbox, filesystem permissions, command-execution controls, and approval requirements. No privilege-escalation mechanism beyond the agent process's existing privileges was identified. ]]>
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Remove `Bash` and `Read` from `allowed-tools` because they are not required by the documented creative-brief workflow. - Permit only the narrowly scoped chat and image-generation capabilities needed for the task. - If file access becomes necessary, restrict it to an explicit project directory and allow only required file types. - If shell access becomes unavoidable, replace unrestricted shell execution with a purpose-built tool that validates arguments and permits only specific operations. - Require explicit user confirmation for access to sensitive files or command execution. - Run the skill in a sandbox with minimal filesystem, network, environment-variable, and operating-system privileges. ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:7
Finding
Installation Instructions Use Mutable and Unverified Upstream Sources<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md:7-16` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned supply-chain installation **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ### Via ClawHub ```bash clawhub install qiaomu-generate-legal-services-ad-creative-brief ``` ### Manual Installation ```bash git clone https://github.com/qiaomucom/generate-legal-services-ad-creative-brief.git cp -r generate-legal-services-ad-creative-brief ~/.openclaw/skills/generate-legal-services-ad-creative-brief ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis Both installation methods retrieve mutable upstream content without specifying a trusted version, immutable Git commit, cryptographic checksum, or signature. Consequently, the content installed by a user in the future may differ from the content covered by this audit. The reviewed repository does not itself contain a malicious dependency or executable payload. The risk arises from trusting the latest state of external distribution channels. If the ClawHub package, GitHub repository, maintainer account, or release process is compromised, altered skill instructions or additional executable files could be delivered without integrity verification. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, registry entry, maintainer account, or publication process. 2. The attacker modifies the distributed skill or adds malicious instructions or scripts. 3. A user follows the documented unpinned `clawhub install` or `git clone` command. 4. The installation retrieves the attacker's current version rather than the version reviewed here. 5. The malicious content becomes available to OpenClaw and may execute or influence the agent according to its declared tools and activation behavior. This is a prospective supply-chain path; no evidence in the audited files establishes that either named upstream source is currently compromised. ### Impact Assessment The potential impact is equivalent to installing an unreviewed skill packa ...[truncated 330 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Pin ClawHub installation to an immutable, documented package version when the package manager supports version constraints. - Pin manual installation to a reviewed Git commit or signed release tag rather than the repository's default branch. - Publish a SHA-256 checksum or cryptographic signature for each approved release. - Add explicit verification commands to the installation procedure and require verification before copying files into the OpenClaw skills directory. - Protect release accounts with multi-factor authentication and use a controlled, auditable publication workflow. - Re-audit the complete contents of each new release before updating the recommended version or integrity value. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.