T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing
- Location
audio-models.md:29- Finding
Untrusted PATH Resolution for Undeclared Audio Model Runner
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is mostly a broad third-party AI and messaging API gateway, not a focused PDF editing skill, and it can send user content plus email or SMS actions through an external service.
Install only if you intentionally want a broad SkillBoss API gateway, not just PDF editing. Treat prompts, documents, media, URLs, phone numbers, and message contents as data sent to an external service and possibly downstream providers. Use a restricted API key, avoid sensitive or regulated data, and require manual confirmation before any email, SMS, scraping, or file-writing workflow.
audio-models.md:29Untrusted PATH Resolution for Undeclared Audio Model Runner
chat-models.md:31Untrusted PATH Resolution for Undeclared Chat Model Runner
image-models.md:22Untrusted PATH Resolution for Undeclared Image Model Runner
video-models.md:9Untrusted PATH Resolution for Undeclared Video Model Runner
The manifest and description present this as a narrowly scoped PDF-editing skill, but the content actually exposes a broad proxy to many unrelated third-party AI, search, scraping, email, and SMS services. This scope mismatch is dangerous because users and policy systems may grant trust or invoke the skill for benign document editing while unintentionally enabling external communications and data transfer far beyond that purpose.
Including email sending and SMS verification in a skill marketed for PDF editing introduces powerful outbound action channels unrelated to user expectations. If invoked with user-controlled inputs, these capabilities could send messages to external recipients, trigger OTP workflows, or facilitate spam, phishing, or unwanted notifications using the configured API key.
The skill documentation does not warn that prompts, documents, images, audio, phone numbers, and other user data may be transmitted to an external aggregator and downstream providers. This omission creates a privacy and trust risk because users may provide sensitive content under the assumption of local PDF editing rather than broad third-party processing.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
One API key, 50+ models across providers (Bedrock, OpenAI, Vertex, ElevenLabs, Replicate, Minimax, and more). Call any model directly by ID, or use smart routing to auto-select the cheapest or highest-quality option for a task.
**Base URL:** `https://api.heybossai.com/v1`
**Auth:** `-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"`
## List Models
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
One API key, 50+ models across providers (Bedrock, OpenAI, Vertex, ElevenLabs, Replicate, Minimax, and more). Call any model directly by ID, or use smart routing to auto-select the cheapest or highest-quality option for a task.
**Base URL:** `https://api.heybossai.com/v1`
**Auth:** `-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"`
## List Models
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
One API key, 50+ models across providers (Bedrock, OpenAI, Vertex, ElevenLabs, Replicate, Minimax, and more). Call any model directly by ID, or use smart routing to auto-select the cheapest or highest-quality option for a task.
**Base URL:** `https://api.heybossai.com/v1`
**Auth:** `-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"`
## List Models
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
One API key, 50+ models across providers (Bedrock, OpenAI, Vertex, ElevenLabs, Replicate, Minimax, and more). Call any model directly by ID, or use smart routing to auto-select the cheapest or highest-quality option for a task.
**Base URL:** `https://api.heybossai.com/v1`
**Auth:** `-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"`
## List Models
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
One API key, 50+ models across providers (Bedrock, OpenAI, Vertex, ElevenLabs, Replicate, Minimax, and more). Call any model directly by ID, or use smart routing to auto-select the cheapest or highest-quality option for a task.
**Base URL:** `https://api.heybossai.com/v1`
**Auth:** `-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"`
## List Models
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s https://api.heybossai.com/v1/models \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"
Chat requests send user prompts and possibly conversation context to an external service aggregator and downstream model providers. In the context of a misrepresented PDF skill with no privacy warning, this creates a meaningful risk of unanticipated data sharing.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/chat/completions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate finding again reflects prompt transmission to external image-generation services. The risk comes from unnecessary, undisclosed third-party data transfer in a skill whose scope does not match its advertised purpose.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate finding again reflects prompt transmission to external image-generation services. The risk comes from unnecessary, undisclosed third-party data transfer in a skill whose scope does not match its advertised purpose.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This workflow not only submits prompts externally but also downloads a returned asset URL to a local file, increasing interaction with remote content beyond simple inference. That expands the attack surface and should not be present in a narrowly scoped PDF-editing skill without strong disclosure and validation.
Save to file:
URL=$(curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"model": "mm/img", "inputs": {"prompt": "A sunset over mountains"}}' \
This duplicate finding covers video-generation prompt transmission to an external API. The contextual risk remains the same: unrelated feature scope and undisclosed off-platform processing of user content.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate finding covers video-generation prompt transmission to an external API. The contextual risk remains the same: unrelated feature scope and undisclosed off-platform processing of user content.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The image-to-video example sends both prompt text and a user-specified image URL to an external provider, potentially exposing private media references or enabling processing of untrusted remote content. This is more dangerous than simple text-only use because it combines external retrieval and third-party media handling.
Image-to-video:
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate finding again indicates third-party transmission of user text for TTS processing. The security concern is the undocumented off-platform handling of user content in a misleadingly scoped skill.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate finding again indicates third-party transmission of user text for TTS processing. The security concern is the undocumented off-platform handling of user content in a misleadingly scoped skill.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate STT finding again highlights export of potentially sensitive audio to an external provider. The lack of purpose alignment and privacy notice increases the practical risk.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate STT finding again highlights export of potentially sensitive audio to an external provider. The lack of purpose alignment and privacy notice increases the practical risk.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
Music-generation prompts are sent to an external service unrelated to the stated PDF-editing purpose. This broadens the skill into a generic multimodal gateway and increases the risk of inappropriate or unexpected data egress.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate background-removal finding reflects sharing image inputs with an external provider outside the expected scope of PDF editing. The issue is primarily improper scope and missing disclosure, not covert exfiltration.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate background-removal finding reflects sharing image inputs with an external provider outside the expected scope of PDF editing. The issue is primarily improper scope and missing disclosure, not covert exfiltration.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
Document processing sends a document URL to a third-party parser, which may expose sensitive file contents to external services. In a document-related skill this can be contextually justified, but the lack of explicit privacy and provider-routing warnings still makes it security-relevant.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This duplicate web-search finding again represents external transmission of user queries to third-party services outside the advertised PDF-editing scope. The mismatch and lack of warning drive the risk.
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
No suspicious patterns detected.