T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:24- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies and Mutable Source Code Are Installed and Executed
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a plausible YouTube research helper, but it asks users to run mutable third-party installs and understates where network traffic and transcript data may go.
Review before installing. Use an isolated environment, pin and review the npm/Python/GitHub dependencies where possible, keep SKILLBOSS_API_KEY out of repositories and logs, and do not send sensitive or private transcript text to SkillBoss unless you intend that remote processing.
SKILL.md:24Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies and Mutable Source Code Are Installed and Executed
The examples force --sub-lang en, which instructs users to retrieve English subtitles only. This is a natural-language/locale constraint presented without opt-in, alternatives, or justification, so it can violate language-choice policy expectations.
The manifest describes a YouTube skill for searching videos, channel info, video details, and transcripts using SkillBoss API Hub or yt-dlp fallback. The documented workflow at these lines adds a separate capability: sending transcript contents to a general chat/pilot endpoint for summarization and analysis, which is not part of the stated retrieval-focused scope.
The transcript analysis example sends full transcript content to an external API, but the documentation does not provide a clear warning that potentially sensitive third-party content may be transmitted off-host. Users may unknowingly upload private, copyrighted, or confidential material to SkillBoss API Hub for LLM processing.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests, os
SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]
API_BASE = "https://api.skillbossai.com/v1"
def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
r = requests.post(
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests, os
SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]
API_BASE = "https://api.skillbossai.com/v1"
def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
r = requests.post(
This code performs an outbound POST to SkillBoss API Hub and can transmit full transcript content to a third-party service. While external transmission is expected for a cloud API, the risk is real when sensitive transcript data is included without strong disclosure, minimization, or consent controls.
API_BASE = "https://api.skillbossai.com/v1"
def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
r = requests.post(
f"{API_BASE}/pilot",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
json=body,
The security note claims all network calls are routed through SkillBoss API Hub, but the skill also instructs direct access to GitHub, YouTube, and likely subtitle endpoints via yt-dlp. This can mislead users about data flow and trust boundaries, causing them to expose API keys or content under false assumptions about where data is sent.
The README tells users to place an API key in an environment variable or config file but does not warn that the key is a sensitive secret that must not be committed, logged, or shared. This can lead to accidental credential exposure in shell history, screenshots, public repositories, or copied config files, enabling unauthorized use of the SkillBoss account or API quota.
The manifest limits the skill's purpose to search, metadata, and transcript fetching. This note states that yt-dlp can download audio as MP3, which is a materially broader media-extraction capability than the declared scope.