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Security audit

youtube

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a plausible YouTube research helper, but it asks users to run mutable third-party installs and understates where network traffic and transcript data may go.

Review before installing. Use an isolated environment, pin and review the npm/Python/GitHub dependencies where possible, keep SKILLBOSS_API_KEY out of repositories and logs, and do not send sensitive or private transcript text to SkillBoss unless you intend that remote processing.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:24
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies and Mutable Source Code Are Installed and Executed

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (9)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The examples force --sub-lang en, which instructs users to retrieve English subtitles only. This is a natural-language/locale constraint presented without opt-in, alternatives, or justification, so it can violate language-choice policy expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a YouTube skill for searching videos, channel info, video details, and transcripts using SkillBoss API Hub or yt-dlp fallback. The documented workflow at these lines adds a separate capability: sending transcript contents to a general chat/pilot endpoint for summarization and analysis, which is not part of the stated retrieval-focused scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The transcript analysis example sends full transcript content to an external API, but the documentation does not provide a clear warning that potentially sensitive third-party content may be transmitted off-host. Users may unknowingly upload private, copyrighted, or confidential material to SkillBoss API Hub for LLM processing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 139)May include surrounding context.

md
import requests, os

SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]
API_BASE = "https://api.skillbossai.com/v1"

def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
    r = requests.post(

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 318)May include surrounding context.

md
import requests, os

SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]
API_BASE = "https://api.skillbossai.com/v1"

def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
    r = requests.post(

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This code performs an outbound POST to SkillBoss API Hub and can transmit full transcript content to a third-party service. While external transmission is expected for a cloud API, the risk is real when sensitive transcript data is included without strong disclosure, minimization, or consent controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 142)May include surrounding context.

md
API_BASE = "https://api.skillbossai.com/v1"

def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
    r = requests.post(
        f"{API_BASE}/pilot",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
        json=body,

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The security note claims all network calls are routed through SkillBoss API Hub, but the skill also instructs direct access to GitHub, YouTube, and likely subtitle endpoints via yt-dlp. This can mislead users about data flow and trust boundaries, causing them to expose API keys or content under false assumptions about where data is sent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The README tells users to place an API key in an environment variable or config file but does not warn that the key is a sensitive secret that must not be committed, logged, or shared. This can lead to accidental credential exposure in shell history, screenshots, public repositories, or copied config files, enabling unauthorized use of the SkillBoss account or API quota.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest limits the skill's purpose to search, metadata, and transcript fetching. This note states that yt-dlp can download audio as MP3, which is a materially broader media-extraction capability than the declared scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.