Back to skill

Security audit

Toani Vault CLI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent Toani CLI helper, but users should treat it as sensitive because it installs a mutable global npm CLI and handles authentication tokens.

Install this only if you intend to use Toani Vault and trust the @toani/vault-cli npm package. Prefer a pinned or reviewed package version where possible, avoid running npm installs with elevated privileges, use least-privilege tokens, and invoke the skill only for Toani-related credential or sandbox workflows.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:55
Finding

Unpinned External npm Package Is Installed Globally

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 13-17 and 55-59
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
install:
  - kind: node
    package: "@toani/vault-cli"
    bins:
      - toani
bash
npm install -g @toani/vault-cli@latest

Technical Analysis

The skill directs the agent to install @toani/vault-cli globally from the npm registry using the mutable latest distribution tag. The declarative installation metadata also specifies the package without an exact version. Consequently, the code executed during installation and subsequent CLI use can change without any corresponding modification to this reviewed skill.

npm packages may execute installation lifecycle scripts and include transitive dependencies. Because the dependency implementation and lockfile are absent from the audited project, this audit cannot verify the code that receives access to authentication tokens, clipboard-assisted login, operating-system keychain storage, configured network endpoints, and remote sandbox operations.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current package release is malicious. Exploitation requires compromise or malicious control of the package, its publishing account, a transitive dependency, or the package distribution channel.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package repository, build pipeline, or a relevant transitive dependency.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release and assigns it to the latest tag.
  3. An agent follows the skill instructions and runs the global installation command.
  4. npm downloads the attacker-controlled release and may execute its lifecycle scripts with the privileges of the invoking user.
  5. The installed toani executable subsequently runs attacker-controlled code when the documented login, cred ...[truncated 1013 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace @latest with an exact, reviewed package version in both the installation metadata and command examples.
  2. Verify package provenance, signatures, publisher identity, and npm registry metadata before installation.
  3. Pin and review transitive dependencies using a lockfile or a controlled internal package mirror.
  4. Record and verify the expected package tarball integrity hash before execution.
  5. Prefer a project-local installation or an isolated execution environment over a global installation.
  6. Avoid running npm installation commands with administrative privileges.
  7. Acquire and inspect the package with lifecycle scripts disabled before allowing installation scripts to run.
  8. Run the CLI with least-privilege tokens and expose sensitive environment variables only for commands that require them.
  9. Establish a controlled update process in which each new package version is reviewed before the pinned version is changed.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says to use the skill when the user mentions broad concepts like "credential hygiene," "token handling," "sandbox automation," and "needs help installing or using the Vault CLI from a coding agent." Several of these are generic security or automation topics and the line does not provide exclusion conditions or negative examples, which increases the risk of unintended invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 198)May include surrounding context.

bash
export TOANI_VAULT_DASHBOARD_BASE_URL=https://dashboard.example.com
export TOANI_BASE_URL=https://api.example.com/
export TOANI_VAULT_TOKEN=<BEARER_TOKEN>