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Security audit

Sovereign Liquidity Sniffer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a small, coherent market-scanner description with no bundled executable code, but users should be careful with the unpinned npx command.

Before installing or running, prefer a pinned and trusted OpenClaw CLI version and confirm the payment/service provider is reputable. Treat the trading-performance claims as unverified because this artifact does not include auditable scanner code.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:22
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution Through npx## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 22 **Vulnerability Type**: `T08: Insecure Dependencies` **Risk Level**: Medium ```bash npx openclaw skill run sovereign-liquidity-sniffer --target BTC ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented command invokes the `openclaw` package through `npx` without specifying an exact package version, verifying an integrity hash, or identifying an authoritative package source. If the package is not already available locally, `npx` may retrieve executable package content from the configured package registry. This project contains only `SKILL.md`; it does not include the package implementation, a dependency lockfile, or integrity metadata. Consequently, the executable code invoked by the documented command is outside the audited artifact and can change independently after review. This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current `openclaw` package is malicious. Exploitation would require the package source, registry resolution, maintainer account, or a subsequently published version to become malicious or compromised. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry account, package distribution channel, or dependency resolution environment. 2. The attacker publishes or causes resolution to a malicious version of the unpinned `openclaw` package. 3. A user follows the command documented in `SKILL.md`. 4. `npx` retrieves the mutable package version when it is not already installed locally. 5. Package lifecycle behavior or the invoked CLI executes attacker-controlled code with the privileges of the user running the command. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code under the invoking user's account. Depending on that account's permissions and environment, the payload could read or modify user-accessible files, access environment variables and credentials, make network requests, or alter local deve ...[truncated 287 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions - Pin `openclaw` to an exact, reviewed version rather than relying on mutable default registry resolution. - Install dependencies through a committed lockfile that records package versions and integrity values. - Verify the package's authoritative name, publisher, registry, provenance, and cryptographic integrity before execution. - Prefer a controlled installation step followed by offline or immutable execution, rather than permitting `npx` to fetch code during normal use. - Disable or carefully review package lifecycle scripts where operationally possible. - Document the trusted registry and installation procedure, including how users should verify package signatures or checksums. - Include the actual scanner implementation or a verifiable reference to its reviewed source so that the behavior claimed by the skill can be audited.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The usage example invokes `npx openclaw` without pinning an exact package version, which can cause users to fetch and execute whatever package version is current at runtime. If the upstream package, dependency chain, or namespace is compromised, users could unintentionally run malicious code on their systems.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.