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Security audit

Core Brainstorming

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This brainstorming skill is mostly transparent and non-executable, but it directs agents to create repository files and make git commits without a clear approval checkpoint.

Review this skill before installing if you do not want brainstorming sessions to automatically produce committed design documents. Use it only with an agent setup that asks before writing files, stages only the intended docs/plans file, shows diffs before commits, and confirms before invoking follow-on planning skills.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:38
Finding
Repository Modification and Git Commit Without an Explicit Approval Checkpoint## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 38-46 **Vulnerability Type**: `T05: Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation` **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code Snippet**: ```markdown ### 文档输出 - 将验证通过的设计写入 `docs/plans/YYYY-MM-DD-<topic>-design.md` - 提交设计文档到 git ### 继续实施(如果需要) - 询问:「准备好开始实施了吗?」 - **REQUIRED SUB-SKILL:** 使用 `core-writing-plans` 创建详细实施计划 ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill's primary purpose is collaborative brainstorming and design development. However, after validating a design, it instructs the Agent to write a file into the current repository and commit that file to Git. It does not require a separate, explicit authorization checkpoint immediately before either operation. Writing repository files and modifying Git history are state-changing actions that exceed the permissions required merely to discuss or present a design. The instruction to invoke the required `core-writing-plans` sub-Skill also expands execution beyond the behavior available for review in this package. The referenced sub-Skill is not included in the audited project, so its permissions and side effects cannot be verified here. The issue does not demonstrate operating-system privilege escalation or credential theft. Its scope is unauthorized use of repository write and version-control privileges already available to the Agent. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the Skill for brainstorming or design assistance. 2. The Agent gathers requirements and presents a design for validation. 3. Once the design is considered validated, the Skill directs the Agent to create a file under `docs/plans/`. 4. The Agent performs the write without obtaining explicit authorization specifically for repository modification. 5. The Agent creates a Git commit without a separate approval checkpoint or a mandated review of the staged diff. 6. If the implementation workflow continues, the Agent invokes `core-writing-plans ...[truncated 1049 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Present the proposed design document in the conversation before performing any file-system operation. 2. Require explicit user approval immediately before writing to `docs/plans/`. 3. Require a second, separate approval immediately before staging or committing changes. 4. Display the target path and complete diff before each repository mutation. 5. Stage only the generated file by using an explicit path rather than broad staging operations. 6. Check for existing staged changes and stop if unrelated changes are present. 7. Make the Git commit optional rather than mandatory, and allow the user to perform it manually. 8. Document the expected source, permissions, and side effects of `core-writing-plans`, or make invocation optional and subject to explicit consent. 9. Preserve the default brainstorming workflow as read-only unless the user clearly requests repository changes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill declares itself mandatory for essentially any creative or behavioral change, which is an overly broad trigger that can cause the agent to invoke this skill in many unrelated contexts. That creates a control-flow and policy risk: the skill can unnecessarily intercept normal tasks, steer user interactions, and expand the scope of data/context inspection beyond what is needed.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill content is written entirely in Chinese and the description mandates its use broadly, implying a fixed language/locale for interaction. There is no indication that users can opt into another language or that the locale restriction is required for a region-specific purpose.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs writing a design document into the workspace and committing it to git, but it does not require explicit user consent or warn that it will modify local files and repository history. In an agent setting, this can lead to unauthorized persistence, unwanted commits, or accidental inclusion of sensitive project details in version control.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.