T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party npm Package Execution
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 29–33
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from an unpinned executable dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown ### Step 1. Install the auxiliar MCP server ```bash claude mcp add auxiliar -- npx auxiliar-mcptext ### Technical Analysis The documented command configures the agent to execute `auxiliar-mcp` through `npx` without specifying an exact package version or verifying package integrity. Depending on the local npm configuration and cache state, `npx` may retrieve the current package release from the configured npm registry and execute it with the invoking user's privileges. Because the package implementation is not included in the audited project, its behavior cannot be verified from this repository. The effective executable payload may also change after this skill has been reviewed if a new upstream release is published. A compromised package publisher, npm account, registry, or newly published malicious release could therefore turn the documented setup operation into arbitrary local code execution. The MCP is also described as returning copy-paste installation commands for other tools. Those secondary commands represent an additional trust boundary and should not be executed automatically without package, source, version, and integrity validation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `auxiliar-mcp` publisher account, package distribution channel, or upstream release process. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the same npm package name. 3. A user or agent follows the skill's documented command without an exact version constraint. 4. `npx` resolves and downloads the mutable package release from the configured registry. 5. The package runs malicious initialization or server code under the account that invoked the command. 6. The payload can access resources available to that account and may recommend additional attacker-controll ...[truncated 697 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Replace the unversioned package reference with an exact, reviewed version, for example:
bash claude mcp add auxiliar -- npx --yes auxiliar-mcp@0.1.0The actual version must be selected only after reviewing that release. Do not use ranges, tags such as
latest, or floating versions. -
Prefer a locked installation workflow using a committed lockfile. Verify npm integrity metadata and retain the expected package digest in release documentation or a trusted manifest.
-
Document the authoritative npm package page, source repository, publisher identity, and release-signing or provenance information so users can validate that they are installing the intended package.
-
Review the package tarball and transitive dependency tree before approving a release. Re-audit whenever the pinned version or dependency lockfile changes.
-
Run the MCP with least privilege in an isolated environment or container. Restrict filesystem access, environment variables, credentials, and outbound network access to what is strictly required.
-
Treat installation commands returned by
solve_taskor related MCP methods as untrusted recommendations. Require explicit user confirmation and validate each package name, source, exact version, integrity value, permissions, and install scripts before execution. -
Disable or scrutinize npm lifecycle scripts where operationally possible, and monitor the package for ownership changes, unexpected releases, and provenance failures.
-
