Gog

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 10:19 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Google Workspace CLI helper, but users should treat its OAuth access and third-party CLI install with care.

Install only if you trust the gog CLI source and are comfortable granting Google Workspace OAuth access. Prefer limiting authorization to the Google services you need, verify the Homebrew tap or upstream project before installing, and confirm any write actions such as sending mail, updating sheets, clearing ranges, or creating calendar events.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:5

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Homebrew Dependency

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependency from a third-party Homebrew tap
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

yaml

metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🎮","requires":{"bins":["gog"]},"install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"steipete/tap/gogcli","bins":["gog"],"label":"Install gog (brew)"}]}}

Technical Analysis

The installation metadata directs users to install gogcli from the third-party Homebrew tap steipete/tap without specifying a version, immutable revision, or expected checksum. Consequently, the component installed in the future may differ from the one available when this skill was audited.

This creates a supply-chain trust boundary outside the reviewed project. If the tap, its maintainer account, the upstream release process, or a referenced binary artifact is compromised, Homebrew could install attacker-controlled content. No evidence in the audited files establishes that the current dependency is malicious; the confirmed issue is the lack of dependency pinning and integrity verification.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the third-party Homebrew tap, upstream release infrastructure, or maintainer credentials.
2. The attacker modifies the formula or replaces an artifact referenced by it with a malicious version.
3. A user follows the skill installation metadata and installs steipete/tap/gogcli.
4. Homebrew processes the altered formula or installs the substituted executable under the user's privileges.
5. When the user configures or invokes gog, the malicious component can access local data available to that process, including OAuth-related material, and can misuse Google Workspace access granted to the CLI.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could execute code with the privileges of the user running Homebrew. Because the documented CLI is authorized for Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Contacts, She ...[truncated 359 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Pin the dependency to a reviewed, immutable release rather than relying on the tap's current formula state.
• Verify downloaded artifacts using a cryptographic checksum or signature tied to the approved release.
• Document the authoritative source repository and expected publisher identity so users can validate provenance.
• Prefer a trusted package source with reproducible release artifacts and verifiable build provenance.
• Review dependency updates before changing the approved version or checksum.
• Request only the Google OAuth services and scopes required for the user's intended tasks rather than enabling all documented services by default.
• Protect locally stored OAuth credentials with restrictive file permissions and revoke them immediately if dependency compromise is suspected.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

md

Use `gog` for Gmail/Calendar/Drive/Contacts/Sheets/Docs. Requires OAuth setup.

Setup (once)
- `gog auth credentials /path/to/client_secret.json`
- `gog auth add [e-mail] --services gmail,calendar,drive,contacts,sheets,docs`
- `gog auth list`