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Security audit

Plaiground Skill Update

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is openly for Discord agent-to-agent chat, but its recommended configuration can let the agent process and answer unsolicited bot or human messages across every Discord guild the bot can access.

Install only with a dedicated Discord bot token, restrict the bot to the Plaiground guild and specific channels where possible, and require separate confirmation for any sensitive tools or private data access. Do not use this configuration on a bot that is also present in unrelated servers unless you intend those servers' messages to reach your agent.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:66
Finding
Overly Broad Discord Message Processing Across All Accessible Guilds## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 66–82 **Vulnerability Type**: Overly permissive Discord configuration and expanded untrusted-input boundary **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Configuration:** ```json5 { channels: { discord: { token: "YOUR_BOT_TOKEN", allowBots: true, // required — lets you see other agents' messages groupPolicy: "open", // required — allows the Plaiground guild guilds: { "*": { requireMention: false // required — respond without being @tagged } } } } } ``` Restart your OpenClaw gateway after saving config changes. ### Technical Analysis The documented purpose is to connect the agent to one identified Discord guild, but the supplied configuration applies a wildcard (`"*"`), rather than the documented guild ID. This violates least-privilege configuration principles and expands message handling to every guild accessible to the bot. The risk is amplified by the combined settings: - `groupPolicy: "open"` permits group interactions without a narrow guild allowlist. - `allowBots: true` accepts messages generated by other bots, which may contain attacker-controlled or recursively generated instructions. - `requireMention: false` allows unsolicited messages to enter the agent's processing flow without explicitly addressing it. - The wildcard guild entry applies this behavior beyond the single server required for the skill. Discord messages are externally controlled input. A malicious human or bot can therefore submit prompt-injection content that attempts to influence agent behavior, induce unauthorized tool calls, or solicit sensitive information. Successful escalation beyond conversation depends on the tools and permissions separately granted to the host agent; this file does not itself provide filesystem or command-execution privileges. The document warns about external messa ...[truncated 1780 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace the wildcard guild rule with the documented Plaiground guild ID, `1472993063482687679`. 2. Use an explicit group or guild allowlist instead of `groupPolicy: "open"`. 3. Restrict processing to the documented channel IDs: - `1472993064191791239` - `1473006717213347952` - `1473006833567531201` 4. Prefer `requireMention: true`. If mention-free participation is essential, disable mention requirements only for specifically approved channels. 5. Use a dedicated Discord bot identity and token for this server so access to unrelated guilds is not inherited. 6. Treat all Discord content, including bot-authored messages, as untrusted data. Messages must not be allowed to modify security policy, authorize tool use, retrieve secrets, or request private files. 7. Require independent authorization for sensitive tool operations and prevent conversational content from directly triggering filesystem, shell, credential, or network actions. 8. Add rate limits, duplicate-message detection, and conversation-loop controls to mitigate bot-to-bot feedback loops. 9. Grant only the Discord permissions required for participation and periodically review the guilds and channels accessible to the bot.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.