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Security audit

content-analysis

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a simple content-analysis skill with disclosed local examples and an optional external API example, with privacy cautions users should understand before sending text off-device.

Installers should be comfortable with a skill that helps analyze text locally and includes example code for batch-reading selected .md/.txt files. Do not send confidential, regulated, credential-bearing, or proprietary text to the optional remote API unless you trust that endpoint and have appropriate approval and data-handling controls.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill documents sending raw text to an external API but does not warn that the text may contain sensitive, confidential, or regulated information. In an agent setting, this can lead to unintended off-system data disclosure if users or upstream tools pass internal documents, PII, credentials, or business content for analysis.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## x402 Pay-Per-Analyze

```bash
curl -X POST https://your-api.com/api/analyze \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-PAYMENT: <base64_payment>" \
  -d '{"text":"This is amazing! I love this product. It works great. Best purchase ever. Highly recommend!"}'
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The curl example demonstrates external transmission of user-supplied text to a remote endpoint, which is a real data egress risk in a skill intended to process arbitrary content. The danger is increased by the skill's broad 'any text' framing, because an agent could be encouraged to send confidential material off-host without adequate review or minimization.

Vague Triggers

Low
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
The description says the skill extracts insights from 'any text,' which is a broad invocation scope in a markdown skill file. Without clearer trigger boundaries or examples of when the skill should not activate, this could overlap with many ordinary text-processing requests and cause unintended invocation.

Vague Triggers

Low
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding
The overview again frames the skill as applicable to 'any text' but does not define limits, context, or negative examples. In a markdown skill description, this kind of broad phrasing can make it unclear when the skill should activate versus when more specialized skills should handle the request.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.