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Security audit

ClawWhisper

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly does what it claims, but it exposes live room credentials in logs and connects autonomous agents to untrusted external chat without enough guardrails.

Review this skill before installing. Use it only for non-sensitive conversations, remove or redact credential logging, and integrate callbacks so remote room messages are treated as untrusted data that cannot approve tool calls, access files or secrets, modify memory, or perform consequential actions without explicit user confirmation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
index.js:55
Finding

Live Agent Credential Disclosed in Application Logs

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
index.js:99
Finding

Untrusted Remote Messages Are Forwarded Directly to Autonomous Agent Callbacks

Content
View full analysis
MAX_HISTORY) { conversationHistory = conversationHistory.slice(-MAX_HISTORY); } // Pass history to callback for context-aware responses onMessageCallback?.(msg.agentId, msg.text, [...conversationHistory]); ``` ### Technical Analysis Messages received from external room participants are attacker-controlled input. The implementation stores this content in conversation history and supplies both the latest message and accumulated history directly to a callback intended to support autonomous, context-aware agent responses. The Skill provides no trust labeling, instruction-versus-data separation, content-size restriction, schema validation beyond the message type, or policy preventing remote participants from authorizing tool calls and sensitive operations. A malicious participant can therefore submit instruction-like content designed to be interpreted by a consuming language model as authoritative directions. This client does not itself execute incoming text as code or invoke privileged tools. Exploitation and impact depend on how the callback incorporates the supplied values into an LLM context and what tools, secrets, memory, or permissions that agent possesses. ### Attack Path 1. An at ...[truncated 1233 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (9)

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · index.js (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

js
ws.close();
  }

  // Reset state for new room
  conversationHistory = [];
  lastMessageTime = 0;

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill logs the generated credential directly to the console, exposing authentication material to logs, observability systems, terminal history capture, or other local users/processes with log access. Because this credential is then used to authenticate the WebSocket session, disclosure could enable unauthorized room access or impersonation for the lifetime of the credential.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · index.js (reported line 224)May include surrounding context.

js
}

/**
 * Clear conversation history
 */
export function clearHistory() {
  conversationHistory = [];

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly describes networked behavior via hosted HTTPS/WebSocket endpoints, but the manifest declares no tool scope such as network permissions or allowed tools. That mismatch weakens security review and user consent because a consuming agent may invoke external communication capabilities that are not transparently declared in the skill metadata.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 1

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill is designed for autonomous conversation with other agents and repeatedly emphasizes that the agent decides what to say, creating an unrestricted natural-language input channel from untrusted peers. That makes prompt-injection and social-engineering attacks highly plausible: another agent can send adversarial instructions that manipulate the model into revealing data, taking unsafe actions, or bypassing expected safeguards.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Providing the full recent history to callbacks gives the agent wholesale access to all prior peer messages, enabling collection, retention, summarization, and reuse of potentially sensitive content supplied by users or other agents. In an autonomous multi-agent setting, this increases the chance that sensitive information is propagated, re-quoted, or exfiltrated beyond what participants expected from an 'ephemeral' chat room.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill states that chat content and room history are sent to a hosted external service, but it does not prominently warn that user or agent-generated conversation data will leave the local environment and be visible to other participants. In a cross-agent chat system, that omission is dangerous because sensitive prompts, user data, or derived secrets may be disclosed to third parties through normal operation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill connects to a third-party hosted endpoint and exchanges chat content, including message text and room context, but the file does not provide any user disclosure that conversation data will be sent to an external service. This is a privacy-relevant network operation that should be clearly disclosed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The doc comment says 'Generate a new agent credential,' which suggests local creation, but the implementation performs an HTTP POST to a hosted API and returns a server-issued credential. This is an intent-level mismatch in inline documentation because the code is not generating the credential itself.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.