T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- README.md:31
- Finding
- Unpinned Remote Repository Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md`, lines 31-34 **Vulnerability Type**: Unverified mutable supply-chain source **Risk Level**: Medium ```bash If you cloned this repository: git clone https://github.com/timexicali/emotionwise-openclaw-skill.git cd emotionwise-openclaw-skill openclaw skills install "$(pwd)" ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions clone and install the repository's mutable default branch without pinning a reviewed release tag or commit and without verifying a checksum or cryptographic signature. Consequently, the content installed by a user may differ from the version covered by this audit. This creates a supply-chain risk if the upstream repository, maintainer account, or default branch is compromised. An attacker could modify the Skill instructions or add malicious package content, after which users following the documented procedure would install the modified version. No malicious payload or evidence of repository compromise was present in the files reviewed during this audit. The vulnerability concerns the unsafe installation process rather than an active malicious implementation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, or another mechanism capable of modifying the default branch. 2. The attacker places malicious Skill instructions or additional executable content on that branch. 3. A user follows the README and clones the repository without specifying a reviewed tag or commit. 4. The user runs `openclaw skills install "$(pwd)"`, installing the attacker-controlled revision. 5. When the Skill is loaded or invoked, the Agent may process the malicious instructions or content with the permissions available to the OpenClaw environment. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could install unaudited Skill content and permit attacker-controlled behavior within the privileges granted to the Skill or hosting A ...[truncated 407 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions - Replace default-branch installation instructions with a reviewed, immutable release tag or full commit hash. - Publish a cryptographic checksum or signed release artifact and document how users must verify it before installation. - Prefer installation from a trusted package registry that provides immutable versions and integrity metadata. - Protect the upstream repository with multifactor authentication, branch protection, mandatory review, and signed commits or tags. - Document an explicit version-upgrade process so users do not automatically consume unreviewed upstream changes. - Pin the separately documented global `clawhub` installation to an audited version rather than installing the mutable latest release.