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Security audit

Skill 106

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is an educational guide about AI agent oversight and does not contain executable behavior or hidden authority requests.

This skill appears safe to install as reference material. Users should treat the included code and API examples as illustrative patterns to adapt carefully to their own approval workflows and production controls, not as drop-in enforcement code.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 143)May include surrounding context.

Failure explanation:

text
Action blocked: DELETE /api/user/123
Reason: Policy violation - requires human approval for user deletion
Escalated to: support-team@company.com (created ticket #12345)

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.