T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
references/compressed-pdas.md:270- Finding
Missing Owner Authorization in the Compressed Account Update Template
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
references/compressed-pdas.md:270-303
Vulnerability Type: Missing object-level authorization
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
rust pub fn update_account<'info>( ctx: Context<'_, '_, '_, 'info, GenericAnchorAccounts<'info>>, proof: ValidityProof, current_account: MyCompressedAccount, account_meta: CompressedAccountMeta, new_message: String, ) -> Result<()> { let light_cpi_accounts = CpiAccounts::new( ctx.accounts.signer.as_ref(), ctx.remaining_accounts, crate::LIGHT_CPI_SIGNER, ); // new_mut consumes input state and creates output state let mut my_compressed_account = LightAccount::<MyCompressedAccount>::new_mut( &crate::ID, &account_meta, current_account, )?; my_compressed_account.message = new_message.clone(); msg!( "Updated compressed account message to: {}", my_compressed_account.message ); LightSystemProgramCpi::new_cpi(LIGHT_CPI_SIGNER, proof) .with_light_account(my_compressed_account)? .invoke(light_cpi_accounts)?; Ok(()) }Technical Analysis
MyCompressedAccountcontains anownerfield, but the update handler does not verify that the stored owner equalsctx.accounts.signer.key(). The signer requirement proves only that some key authorized the transaction; it does not prove that the signer owns the compressed account being modified.The validity proof establishes that the supplied compressed-account state exists in the relevant Merkle tree. It does not provide application-level authorization. Likewise,
LightAccount::new_mutreconstructs and transitions the supplied state but does not replace a program-specific owner check.Because compressed-account state and its metadata can be obtained through public blockchain RPC s ...[truncated 1334 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
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Verify ownership before constructing the mutable light account:
rust require_keys_eq!( current_account.owner, ctx.accounts.signer.key(), ErrorCode::Unauthorized ); -
Derive the expected compressed address from signer-bound seeds and the approved address tree, then verify that
account_meta.addressequals that derived address. -
Do not rely on proof possession, transaction fee payment, or an arbitrary signer as authorization.
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Apply explicit authorization checks to every mutable or destructive operation, including update, close, burn, and reinitialization.
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Add negative tests proving that a second keypair cannot update an account owned by the original creator.
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Where delegated updates are required, implement an explicit and narrowly scoped delegation record rather than weakening the owner check.
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