T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Unrestricted Cross-Agent Session Collection and External Disclosure
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill openly generates and sends a Feishu daily report, but it does so by reading raw cross-agent session logs and reusing private DM text without clear consent, scoping, or review controls.
Review this skill carefully before installing. It should only be used in an environment where all affected agents and users have agreed that their same-day DM-derived work messages may be collected, stored in a plaintext report, and sent to the configured Feishu destination. Prefer adding explicit approval, redaction, fixed recipient allowlisting, and a narrower work-log source before use.
SKILL.md:29Unrestricted Cross-Agent Session Collection and External Disclosure
These instructions define a workflow that collects user-originated content from session logs and repurposes it into a generated report. That is a direct data-leakage pattern because private user messages are harvested from stored conversations and transformed for secondary use without consent or clear need-to-know boundaries.
The extraction logic specifically tells the agent to parse DM records, strip identifiers, and reuse the actual user utterances as work records. This is especially dangerous because it operationalizes disclosure of verbatim private communications, increasing the chance of leaking secrets, personal data, or confidential business information.
Sending the compiled report to Feishu extends the exposure from local processing to a separate communication channel, increasing the blast radius of any included sensitive content. Once transmitted, the data may be retained, forwarded, or accessed by unintended recipients, making recovery and containment much harder.
The trigger phrases are broad enough that normal conversation like '生成日报' or '工作日报' may invoke the skill unintentionally. Because this skill reads session logs, saves a report, and sends content onward, accidental invocation can cause unauthorized processing and disclosure of user-derived data.
The skill explicitly directs direct reading of session JSONL logs and extraction of user messages, but provides no privacy warning or access-control requirement. Reading historical conversations from other agents is highly sensitive and can expose confidential user content outside the original interaction context.
The skill instructs the agent to save a compiled report to disk and send it to Feishu without any notice, consent, or data-classification guardrails. This creates a real risk of silently exfiltrating sensitive internal or personal content derived from user sessions to persistent storage and an external messaging destination.
No suspicious patterns detected.