T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:43- Finding
Payment Workflow Lacks Transaction-Specific User Confirmation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 43–59
Vulnerability Type: Financial transaction without an explicit confirmation gate
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Snippet
markdown **Step 1 — Request the lookup.** An unpaid request returns HTTP 402 with the exact payment terms: ```bash curl -s "https://scout-packs-production.up.railway.app/lookup?query=<company name or domain>"The 402 response tells you exactly what to pay: $0.01 USDC on Base to the
payToaddress shown (USDC contract0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913, amount10000base units). Always use thepayToaddress from the live 402 response, never a cached one.If the company isn't in the index you get a 404 with suggestions instead — no payment needed. Only pay when the 402 challenge confirms your query matched.
Step 2 — Pay from a wallet you control. Send exactly $0.01 USDC on Base to the
payToaddress and wait for confirmation. Standard x402 agents may instead sign an EIP-3009 authorization and retry with the signature in theX-PAYMENT(v1) /PAYMENT-SIGNATURE(v2) header — the payment is verified and settled by facilitator, no separate transfer needed.text ### Technical Analysis The documented workflow directs an agent to perform an irreversible cryptocurrency payment, or sign an EIP-3009 payment authorization, immediately after receiving an HTTP 402 response. It does not require transaction-specific approval from the user after presenting the final query, amount, token, network, and recipient. The remote service controls the live HTTP 402 response and therefore supplies the `payTo` address used by the agent. Although the document states that the payment should be exactly $0.01 USDC on Base, it provides no enforced approval gate or executable validation mechanism. The instructions also encourage agents to use the live recipient rather than a previously reviewed recipient. ...[truncated 1333 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Require explicit user confirmation immediately before every payment or signed payment authorization.
- Display the exact lookup query, amount, token contract, network, recipient address, and cumulative session spend in the confirmation prompt.
- Reject any HTTP 402 challenge whose amount, token contract, or chain differs from the documented values.
- Enforce a hard maximum of $0.01 USDC per lookup rather than relying only on prose instructions.
- Add configurable per-session call and spending limits, with additional confirmation before exceeding them.
- Default batch enrichment to a quote or dry-run mode that reports expected costs before initiating any transaction.
- Ensure cancellation or ambiguous user responses cannot be interpreted as payment authorization.
